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Almost all of us need to borrow money at some 
stage in our lives. Credit can help with the purchase 
of major assets like houses and cars; allow 
purchases to be spread for home improvements 
or holidays; and smooth out unexpected income 
shocks when the washing machine needs replacing 
or the car requires essential repairs. But credit 
can be a thorny issue, encompassing our own 
upbringing and prejudices; the importance of 
saving, and the merits of borrowing. 
People in the UK owed £1,665 billion at the end of 
October 2019, including £225 billion of consumer 
credit.1 These figures should give pause for 
consideration, as while credit can be a vital tool for 
many people, it should never be a substitute for 
fair wages or a decent welfare system. 
There is a significant ‘poverty premium’ in the UK 
consumer credit market. Those on low incomes, 
with limited credit history, are most likely to be 
excluded from mainstream forms of credit, such 
as bank loans or credit cards. They instead may 
borrow from non-mainstream high cost credit 
providers, paying a significant price to do so. 
Alternatively, they may be forced to meet their 
financial needs through other routes that are far 
from optimal, such as borrowing from friends and 
family or defaulting on council tax and other bills – 
both trends which are on the rise. These are issues 
of public policy, and of market failure, affecting 
millions of UK households. 
Since 2016, the Carnegie UK Trust has grappled 
with the complex problem of access to credit for 
low income households. We convened a range of 
private, public and civil society organisations to 
explore this challenge, resulting in our “Gateway 
to Affordable Credit” report. Since then we have 
continued to highlight the importance of good, 
fair, affordable credit with associated wraparound 
services. 
We saw then, and now, the potential to scale 
up an alternative sector of ethical, not for profit, 
lenders who aim to meet the needs of low income 
consumers fairly, by providing affordable loans 
1  https://themoneycharity.org.uk/money-statistics/ 
and access to other services, such as debt advice, 
savings products and basic bank accounts. With 
the support of the Scottish Government, we 
established our Affordable Credit Loan Fund of 
£2m to begin to address these issues by supporting 
not for profit lenders in their growth ambitions. 
We want to see an increase in the scale and 
sustainability of those providers, where the needs 
of the borrower are aligned with the motivation of 
the lender. 
This excellent report by the University of Salford 
highlights many of these issues and examines how 
you achieve the step change necessary to enable 
these social lenders to reach many more people. 
Working with seven Community Development 
Finance Institutions (CDFIs) the research team 
at Salford interviewed, assessed and appraised 
lenders’ data. We are grateful to the CDFIs and 
their trade body Responsible Finance for entrusting 
us with their information and thoughts. 
To make the step change to £200m of lending per 
year from a sector that has hovered around £20m 
for many years is a significant challenge. However, 
as the report suggests there are opportunities to 
begin to meet that challenge. The CDFI sector has 
operated through financial crisis and recession, it is 
a sector that has increasingly professionalised its 
outlook and practices and is open minded to the 
range of opportunities that can assist its growth 
and development. With the arrival of organisations 
like Fair for All Finance, new opportunities exist 
to address the challenges associated with 
operationally sustainable lending. There has never 
been a better time to make the step change. 
What is certain is that the needs of low income 
consumers will not go away. 
We commend this report as a valuable contribution 
to the debate. 
Sarah Davidson
Chief Executive, Carnegie UK Trust 
Foreword
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Research overview and background
Access to credit is an essential part of modern life, 
but millions of UK consumers cannot access credit 
or have to pay a premium to access it, leaving 
them at greater risk of customer detriment and 
poverty. In the past 6-7 years, there has been a 
renewed interest in supporting alternatives in the 
form of affordable credit. The government directed 
£55m of Dormant Assets allocation to financial 
inclusion which led to the establishment of Fair4All 
Finance, independent of government, Michael 
Sheen set up the End High Cost Credit Alliance and 
Carnegie UK Trust set up an Affordable Credit Loan 
Fund out of its own endowment.
Community Development Finance Institutions 
(CDFIs) – not-for-profit lenders serving low income 
consumers – are an important part of the solution. 
Yet they barely register in relation to the need. In 
2018, they lent £26m compared with £4.5bn by 
the commercial high cost credit sector. Carnegie 
UK Trust commissioned Community Finance 
Solutions, University of Salford, to determine if and, 
if so, how the sector can achieve a step change 
in growth to make a greater dent in the need and 
demand for affordable credit. The central aim was 
to develop proposals for a step change to £200m of 
operationally sustainable lending by 2027. The study 
draws on international case studies, stakeholder 
interviews and financial analysis of seven of the 
main personal lending CDFIs. 
Personal lending CDFIs in the UK
The personal lending CDFI sector serves some of 
the poorest and most vulnerable households in the 
UK, such the unemployed, benefit recipients, single 
parents, social housing tenants on low-incomes.
A rise in in-work poverty, welfare reform and the 
proliferation of online high cost credit lenders 
following the financial crisis, has led CDFIs to 
expand their target group to include low-income 
people in work and consumers of online high 
cost credit. Credit unions also form part of the 
affordable credit landscape but often serve a more 
mixed and better-off customer base as they lend 
to people with a track record of saving, use their 
members’ savings and are restricted in the rate 
they can charge.
Executive summary
CDFI customers 2012-18 (%)
2012 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018
Female 65 62 62 55 48 61
Unemployed 74 63 52 51 40 50
Benefit recipients 71 60 47 66
Single parents 26 49 42 54 28 42
Social housing tenants 71 70 56 46 43 53
HH income > £15,000 78 58 55 57 48
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Social and financial 
achievements of the sector
 CDFIs reach those most in need: Customer 
data underlines the role of CDFIs as ubiquitous 
vehicles for reaching the most excluded. They 
provide small loans, typically £350 to 400 to 
new customers, linked savings accounts and 
support to people that are unemployed, in 
social housing, women and lone parents on low 
incomes. Many pay less to access credit, save 
regularly and improve their wellbeing as a result 
of accessing these services.
 Improvements in sustainability: The CDFIs 
significantly reduced their deficits, generally by 
growing the interest income at a greater rate than 
the costs. There were substantial improvements in 
levels of operational and financial sustainability. 
Most improved productivity through rationalising 
the lending process, including telephone lending 
and making efficiencies in the customer journey.
 Uneven performance across sector: 
Performance across the sector is uneven. 
The data suggests that some providers 
outperform the rest of the sector on a recurring 
basis in terms of productivity, efficiency and 
sustainability. Greater loan sizes, greater scale 
and low total and per loan costs all positively 
contribute to a stronger financial performance. 
 Need for a clear sectoral narrative: There is a 
lack of a clear, sectoral narrative concerning the 
financial and social dimension of the sector. The 
participating CDFIs use different measures and 
ways of presenting the business models, and 
portfolio characteristics, performance and arrears. 
This makes it difficult for potential investors to 
assess the risks and rewards of investing. There is 
a lack of consistency in articulating and capturing 
target customer characteristics and outcomes.
 Risks and rewards of remote underwriting: 
Moving to remote underwriting and delivery, 
especially online, automated lending, has the 
potential to significantly reduce costs at least 
over the long term. Falls in delivery costs seemed 
greater than associated increases in customer 
acquisition costs. However, customer data and 
CDFI manager testimonies suggest that online 
borrowers are more likely to be homeowners, 
male, younger and less likely to be unemployed.
Scaling up the personal lending 
CDFI sector
 Clear growth potential but will take longer 
than 10 years to reach £200 million: Despite 
improvements in efficiency and sustainability, it is 
unrealistic to expect the sector to grow to £200m 
in a 10-year timeframe. This would require an 
annual growth rate of over 25% (see chart on p. 5). 
Such growth is rarely achieved even by companies 
operating in conventional, well-functioning markets: 
fewer than 10% of UK companies can be classed 
as high growth, achieving 20% growth annually for 
3 years of more.
 Need for significant upfront investment: 
Achieving a step-change in growth will require 
significant upfront investment in systems 
and management teams. Following a 25% 
annual growth trajectory, the sector would 
need over £3.5m to cover operating costs and 
nearly £8m to cover capital investments in the 
first three years. The CDFIs are not unique in 
requiring such investment to scale up. Indeed, 
we have not come across a single example of 
scaling up of a microfinance institution that 
have not involved such investment. Even large 
commercial players have benefitted from 
substantial investment and grant funding from 
international development agencies in the 
start-up phase.
 Need to new and different funding models: 
The current capital and funding models are 
inadequate and insufficient to scaling up of 
the sector. The capital requirement to scale up 
is £120m after income, current cash reserves 
and current long-term funding. The sector will 
need patient and appropriately priced capital to 
scale up. The premium associated with paying 
10% versus 6% for funding is over £1.5m in 
the first four years, significantly reducing their 
capacity to grow. Patient capital would enable 
them to cover their cumulative deficit for the 
first three years, an important stumbling block 
for scaling up, and strengthen their balance 
sheets. Lessons from Europe and the US point 
to the need for a mechanism to compel or 
require private sector partners, especially banks, 
to lend to and invest in CDFIs (e.g. regulatory 
requirements or a social compact between 
banks, government and affordable credit 
providers).
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Recommendations
1. Government provides initial investment to help sector scale up
a. We recommend that Government and other investors provide patient capital to CDFIs with an 
efficient delivery model, low cost base and viable growth strategy.
b. We recommend that Government opens up Innovate UK funding to CDFIs.
2. Mechanisms to leverage greater private investment in the sector
a. We recommend that Fair4All develop clear, shared social outcome objectives that can inform a clear 
ask of private and public sector actors in terms of support for CDFIs.
b. We recommend that Government agrees a new social compact with mainstream financial institutions 
and CDFIs detailing their responsibilities and contributions.
c. We recommend that Fair4All and partners pilot a guarantee fund for new investment or investment 
on substantially improved terms in the sector.
d. We recommend that Government extends the Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) to personal 
lending CDFIs. Although it would likely have a modest impact on investment it is a proven mechanism 
that would involve little costs for CDFIs and investors.
3. Consolidation or greater coordination among CDFIs
a. We recommend that investors encourage greater consolidation by collectively supporting only 
providers with cost-effective operating models and viable business models.
b. We recommend that Government, investors and trade bodies encourage CDFIs to explore areas of 
collaboration.
4. Common reporting and benchmarking framework
a. We recommend that social investors, social investment funds, foundations and Government agree on 
a common reporting and benchmarking framework building on the work of Responsible Finance in 
connection with its industry survey.
b. We recommend that investors require all investees to sign a transparency compact to publicly report 
on this data. 
5. Greater coordination among social investors
a. We recommend that the social investors develop co-investment agreements to reduce costs and 
decrease lead-in time.
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1.1. The need for affordable credit
Access to affordable credit is an essential part 
of modern life for households. It helps bridge 
periodic gaps between income and expenditure 
and enables households to make large expenditure 
in a timely fashion. Most of us take this access 
for granted. We can choose between multiple 
providers and can access credit at low or even 
no cost (e.g. arranged overdraft, credit card paid 
on time). However, many – perhaps as many as 
10-12m consumers – have few, if any, options to 
access credit. These consumers typically come 
from low-income households and have high levels 
of financial pressure on the household, such as 
having someone out of work (Worton et al, 2018). 
They are part of what is often called the non-
standard or subprime credit market.
This group pay more to access credit, often referred 
to as the poverty premium. These households have 
fewer options and have to pay considerably more 
to access credit. Many of them have not built up 
a credit history, for example because they operate 
in cash or use prepayment meters rather than 
direct debit. It is estimated that, as a result, these 
consumers pay a premium of between £75 and 
£80 a year (Corfe and Keohane, 2018). 
They are also more likely to have a poor credit 
rating because they have low and fluctuating 
incomes, which mean they need greater flexibility 
in repayments. This is due, in part, to the increase 
in insecure work. Citizens Advice estimates that 
4.5m UK workers are currently in insecure work, 
although the trade union GMB estimate it to be 
around one in three of the workforce or closer to 
10m people. They also have fewer if any assets, 
against which they can borrow.
Unable to access mainstream sources of 
borrowing, many in this group – around 3m2 
2 https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-publishes-outcome-
high-cost-credit-review
– resort to the commercial high cost credit or 
subprime sector. One of the best-known examples 
of high cost credit was Wonga. Launched in 
2008, the payday lender grew rapidly, as its 
online lending platform meant individuals could 
easily and quickly access credit. These firms 
charge high interest rates, due to the lack of price 
sensitivity among potential customers, limited 
competition in some market segments and the 
costs of delivery. Historically their business models 
have been predicated on repeat borrowing and a 
propensity among consumers to miss payments 
and incur additional late and default fees. For 
example, BrightHouse, the Rent to Own retailer, 
acknowledged a higher revenue yield from “high 
risk” rather than “less risky” customers.3 It is 
estimated that in 2018, 300,000 people were in 
debt to illegal moneylenders according to the HM 
Treasury,4 and approximately 3.6m people had 
borrowed from family and friends (Financial Lives 
Survey, 2017) not all of which will be benign, and it 
is highly likely that this source of credit is finite.
This lack of access to affordable credit alternatives 
exacerbates poverty in deprived communities. The 
high interest rate payment drains already scarce 
resources from communities, which could otherwise 
be spent in the local economy supporting local 
employment and generating tax revenue. Research 
has found that users of commercial high cost credit 
are more likely to experience customer detriment, 
such as unsustainable debt. The Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), found that 67% of payday loan 
borrowers, and 49% of short-term instalment 
borrower are overindebted in the UK. This is 
compared to 15% of UK adults (FCA, 2019). Other 
studies have found that they are also more likely to 
fall behind on rent payments putting households 
at greater risk of eviction (Gowans, 2018). 
Whichever way you look at the issue, the poor pay 
more. 
3 See, for example, BrightHouse – Q3 16/17 Results 23 February 2017 (slide 9) 
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-bites-back-in-the-fight-
against-loan-sharks
1. Research overview and 
background
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1.2. The affordable credit agenda
In the last 6-7 years, there has been a resurgence 
in interest in how to resolve the access to and 
provision of affordable credit. Carnegie UK Trust 
has played an important role in stimulating this 
renewal of interest in the agenda. The Trust works 
to improve the lives and wellbeing of people 
throughout the UK, with a focus on those who 
are disadvantaged, through supporting research 
within four key work areas (digital futures, enabling 
wellbeing, flourishing towns and fulfilling work). 
Within the remit of fulfilling work, Carnegie UK 
Trust have contributed to work on how to resolve 
the provision of affordable credit, most notably 
though their Meeting the Need for Affordable 
Credit (2015) report, their Gateway to Affordable 
Credit report (2018) and their seeding of a 
£1m Loan Fund established in 2018 to support 
affordable credit providers.
Alongside this, in 2013, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Justin Wellby, announced that he 
wanted to outcompete Wonga and the payday-
lending sector and set up the Just Finance 
Foundation. The charity works to support 
programmes that aim to improve the supply of 
affordable credit and help to make individuals 
more financially capable. The actor, Michael 
Sheen, launched the End High Cost Credit 
Alliance in 2018. The Alliance focuses on five 
key areas of action (alternatives to credit; public 
debate; regulation, policy and practice; the wider 
workforce; and education) to tackle high cost credit 
and debt in the UK. Low or no-interest schemes 
such as the Good Shepherd in Australia have 
generated considerable interest, leading the HM 
Treasury to commission research into a similar UK 
scheme. Significantly, the government agenda 
has re-emerged, with the direction of £55m of 
Dormant Assets allocation to financial inclusion, 
which led to the establishment of Fair4All Finance, 
independent of government. Their mission is 
to increase the financial resilience of people in 
vulnerable circumstances through access to fair 
and affordable financial products and services. 
Their initial focus is on scaling affordable credit 
and they launched a pilot programme in July last 
year with five providers. Findings from their work 
are due out shortly.
1.3. The personal lending CDFI sector
The personal lending Community Development 
Finance Institution (CDFI) sector is an important 
part of any solution to meet the need for 
affordable credit. They provide small loans (around 
£500) and, often, linked gateway services (e.g. 
advice, budgeting support, savings) to households 
unable to access mainstream financial services, 
especially credit. The CDFIs deliver services 
through branches, online or over the telephone. 
The sector is composed of a diverse set of not-for-
profit, non-deposit taking organisations that rely 
on grants, equity and loans to raise capital for on-
lending. The first personal lending CDFIs emerged 
in the early 2000s on the back of the 1999 report 
by Dayson, Paterson and colleagues (1999). There 
are around 10-12 personal lending CDFIs that take 
different institutional and legal forms, including 
companies limited by guarantee, community 
interest companies and the old industrial provident 
societies. 
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1.4 Overview of research
The sector has grown significantly since its 
inception (Chart 1.1).
The sector grew from providing less than 2,000 
loans with a value of around £1m in 2004 to nearly 
46,000 loans with a value of £26m in 2018. Yet, 
this still barely registers in relation to the need. 
The commercial high cost credit sector provides 
(using only the most egregious definitions) £4.5bn 
in lending to 4.4m consumers.5 According to the 
2017 Financial Lives Survey by the FCA, 4.1m of UK 
adults are in financial difficulties, around 2m are 
unbanked and 13m lack a savings buffer to deal 
with unexpected expenses.
Carnegie UK Trust commissioned Community 
Finance Solutions, University of Salford, to 
determine if and, if so, how the sector can achieve 
a step change in growth to make a greater dent in 
the need and demand for affordable credit. The 
central aim of the study was to develop proposals 
for a step change to £200m of operationally 
sustainable lending by 2027. The research has a 
dual objective:
5 FCA, July 2016 figures include HCSTC, Home Credit, rent-to-own, 
Guarantor, Running Account, Logbook, Catalogue, and store card. 
Specifically, this figure does not include retail finance, overdrafts, all credit 
cards, pawnbroking, budgeting loans and friends and family borrowing
• Conduct a contextualised analysis of 
social and financial achievements and 
strategies by the sector;
• Analyse and discuss potential levers to 
bring about step change in growth of  
the sector;
Community Finance Solutions worked with MFR 
Rating, a leading international microfinance 
rating agency in the collation and analysis of the 
financial data. Seb Aslan and Rob Freeman from 
Community Investment Services Ltd worked on the 
case study on Community Investment Tax Relief.
The methodology applied consists of the following 
components:
 Participating CDFIs: Seven CDFIs participated 
in the study, including the main players with 
the largest loan books and greatest number 
of customers: Scotcash, Street UK, Moneyline-
UK, Fair Finance, Five Lamps, Places for People 
(PfP) Financial Services and Coventry and 
Warwickshire Reinvestment Trust (CWRT). We 
estimate that these providers make up over 
90% of the personal lending CDFI market.
 Financial analysis: We analysed financial and 
institutional data (see Appendix B) from the 
Chart 1.1: CDFI personal lending
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participating CDFIs for the period 2013/14-
2016/17. We interviewed CDFI managers and 
chairs and reviewed business plans, budgets 
and management accounts.
 Case study research: We conducted 
case study research of international and 
UK examples which were successful and 
unsuccessful at scaling up (see table). 
 Interviews: We interviewed a range of 
stakeholders, including social investors, civil 
servants, affordable credit managers and 
others (see Appendix B). We also interviewed 
customers. 
The remainder of the report is organised into four 
chapters:
• Chapter 2 – Context – This chapter provides 
an overview of the market in which CDFIs 
operate in terms of target customers and the 
commercial high cost credit sector they are 
seeking to replace. It discusses other affordable 
credit providers, and government policy and 
support.
• Section 3 – Achievements to date – This 
chapter draws on the financial, institutional 
and interview data to assess the achievements 
of the sector. It considers social (generating 
positive outcomes for excluded groups) and 
financial (ability to operate with limited subsidy) 
dimensions of performance
• Section 4 – Scaling up the personal lending 
CDFI sector – The chapter analyses and 
discusses the different potential pathways for 
scaling up the sector. It considers three different 
logics to scaling up: commercial (achieving 
financial sustainability through efficient delivery 
model and pricing reflecting delivery costs), 
public policy logic (expansion through fulfilling 
public policy objectives) and technological 
(transforming delivery, business and funding 
models). 
• Section 5 – Scaling up – the way forward – This 
final chapter identifies and discusses potential 
pathways for scaling up. The chapter makes 
several recommendations.
• Section 6 – References
Additional documentation can be found in 
Appendices A-C:
• Appendix A – Detailed methodology
• Appendix B – List of interviewees and workshop 
participants
• Appendix C – Case studies
Focus Case studies
Fintech opportunities Blockchain
Big Data
Artificial Intelligence
Successful attempts scaling up Adie (France)
PerMicro (Italy)
Qredits (Netherlands) 
Compartamos (Mexico)
Supportive government frameworks Community Reinvestment Act (US)
CITR (UK) 
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2.1. Introduction
Before looking at the results of the analysis, we 
need to understand the context in which the CDFI 
sector operates. This chapter is organised into four 
sections. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the 
target customers for CDFIs and the issues they 
face. Section 2.3 details the commercial high cost 
credit activities, which the CDFIs are seeking to 
displace. We then move on to discuss the credit 
unions, another important player in the affordable 
credit sector in Section 2.4 and government policy 
(Section 2.5). 
2.2. The CDFI target market
The customers of the personal lending CDFI 
sector are among the poorest and most vulnerable 
households in the UK, such as the unemployed, 
benefit recipients, single parents, social housing 
tenants and low-income households (Table 2.1).
These groups have consistently made up the 
majority or significant proportion of the customer 
base of CDFIs since their inception. They are often 
unable to access mainstream credit and have 
limited or no savings buffer to meet unexpected 
costs (Responsible Finance, 2017; nef, 2008; GHK, 
2015). Moreover, they have made up the customer 
base of the traditional commercial high cost 
credit sector, consisting of Rent-to-Own firms (e.g. 
Brighthouse), home credit (e.g. Provident) and 
pawnbrokers, which the CDFIs have been seeking 
to displace.
Since the financial crisis, changes in the 
commercial high cost credit sector and poverty 
have led to a debate within the sector about who 
the CDFIs should serve. The emergence and rapid 
growth of payday lending and online commercial 
high cost credit firms has brought new customer 
groups into the market. As discussed in Section 
2.3, users of these products are more likely to be 
male, younger, in employment and have higher 
incomes compared with CDFI and traditional 
high cost credit customers (see e.g. Social Market 
Foundation, 2015), most of whom are women, on 
benefits and low incomes. Additionally, traditional 
high cost credit providers, such as Brighthouse and 
Provident, have been shifting to lower risk, better 
off customers. 
2. Context – personal lending 
CDFIs in the UK
Table 2.1: CDFI customers 2012-18 (%) 
2012 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018
Female 65 62 62 55 48 61
Unemployed 74 63 52 51 40 50
Benefit recipients 71 60 47 66
Single parents 26 49 42 54 28 42
Social housing tenants 71 70 56 46 43 53
HH income > £15,000 78 58 55 57 48
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Poverty has also changed. The number of working 
age adults in in-work poverty increased by more 
than half a million to nearly 4m from 2012/13 to 
2016/17 (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2018). 
This has been especially prevalent among those 
in part-time employment. Since 2012/13, working 
age adults living in households in employment 
now make up the majority of people in poverty. 
Previously, adults in workless households made 
up most of adults in poverty (ibid). This is due 
to changes in the benefit system, especially 
reductions to benefits and tax credit entitlements 
and in the labour market.
The introduction of Universal Credit (UC) has 
been among the key changes to the welfare 
system. UC replaces the main means-tested 
benefits and tax credits for working age people 
(Salford City Council, 2017). The key features 
include payments being paid monthly in arrears as 
opposed to weekly; a greater emphasis on online 
administration; more stringent conditions, with 
sanctions for their breach and; a taper at 63% 
whereby benefits will be withdrawn as income 
increases (ibid). 
UC is intended to simplify the benefit system and 
smooth the transition in and out of work. Despite 
this, many families are expected to experience 
losses in income, with 83% of the loss expected 
to fall on families with dependent children – the 
very customer who has been a regular CDFI 
borrower. On average, couples with two or more 
children could potentially lose £1,450 a year, while 
lone parents with two children or more could lose 
£1,750. Reforms also hit those of working age 
in the social rented sector hard, and they can 
potentially lose £1,700 a year compared with £290 
for working age owner-occupiers (2017). Analysis 
of vintages by one CDFI have already highlighted 
the greater challenge around collections when the 
borrower is a UC recipient, caused by fluctuations 
in UC income.
Alongside the changes to the welfare system, there 
has also been a shift in the number of individuals 
in low paid and insecure, work. Insecure work 
can be defined as those working in low paid part 
time or in temporary jobs who have not been in 
their position long enough to be entitled to all 
employment rights (Gregg and Gardiner, 2015). 
Citizens Advice estimate that 4.5m UK workers are 
in insecure work (not including self-employment), 
whilst reports for the GMB suggest it could be as 
high as 10m. The rise of insecure work is believed 
to have contributed to falling wages in the last 10 
years. Chart 2.1 shows the evolution of real wages 
between 2010 and 2018. 
Real wages fell for nearly four consecutive years 
(2010-14) before growing from the end of 2014 to 
2016. In 2017 real wages fell again before starting 
to increase in early 2018. Other reasons for the 
fall in real wages includes low and falling levels 
Chart 2.1: Growth real wages 2010-18 (%)
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of unionisation, increase in self and part-time 
employment, a larger than usual proportion of low-
skilled jobs among new jobs created, and low and 
falling levels of productivity.
Several CDFIs have started introducing and 
piloting online lending to cater to this group of 
younger men in employment. This is discussed 
in greater detail in Section 3.2. There is no 
consensus in the sector that the CDFIs should 
switch to this market segment, as some providers 
remain focused on serving those in the lowest 
5-10% income brackets. Furthermore, those in 
employment have traditionally been the domain 
of credit unions and more recently Fintech 
companies, such as Salary Finance.
2.3. The CDFI competitor: 
 Commercial high cost credit
With limited savings and unable to access 
mainstream credit, many low-income, financially 
excluded consumers borrow from commercial 
high cost credit providers to cover large one-off 
expenses (e.g. Christmas, white goods etc.) or living 
costs (e.g. bills, food etc.). These lenders principally 
cater to credit-impaired and higher risk borrowers 
who fail to qualify for loans or other products 
with mainstream financial institutions. The sector 
offsets this greater risk by charging higher interest 
rates and fees relative to the mainstream sector. 
An important objective for the CDFI sector is 
to displace such lending, as it is associated with 
customer detriment and increasing the poverty 
premium. 
Table 2.2 shows the number of customers by type 
of commercial high cost credit.
of UK personal debt.
Overall, the high cost credit sector declined 
in terms of the number of consumers taking 
out a loan from 7.7m in 2013 to 5.8m in 2015, 
before increasing again in 2016. The number of 
customers using catalogue credit and high cost 
short-term credit (HCSTC) has fallen significantly 
(30% and 53% respectively since 2013). However, 
the amount of outstanding debt for catalogue 
credit has increased significantly. Retail finance has 
experienced the greatest growth (28%) since 2013. 
The others have remained relatively stable.
It was estimated that 75% of adults have had 
one or more consumer credit product over the last 
year, and 46% can be described as still paying for 
credit now (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017). 
This can often be a result of taking out loans to 
cover previous debt, such as taking out a payday 
loan to cover the cost of credit card debt. This can 
lead to a debt spiral, with many juggling multiple 
repayments simultaneously (Dearden et al, 2010).
Table 2.2: Number of customers by type of subprime credit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Catalogue credit 2.8m 2.7m 2.0m 1.8m 1.9m
Retail finance 1.8m 1.8m 1.9m 2.1m 2.3m
Store credit 0.5m 0.5m 0.4m 0.4m 0.4m
HCSTC 1.7m 1.2m 0.7m 0.8m
Home credit 0.9m 0.8m 0.7m 0.6m 0.7m
Rent-to-Own 0.2m 0.2m 0.2m 0.2m
Source: FCA (2017) High cost credit review technical annexe 1: credit reference agency (CRA) data analysis
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Table 2.3 shows the customer characteristics by 
type of high cost credit. 
Broadly speaking, those who use HCSTC services 
are often on benefits and in low paid or insecure 
work (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017), though 
there is still variation across the different types.
Home credit users are more commonly women 
on low incomes and social housing tenants. Most 
pawnbroker customers are also women. Those who 
take out payday loans online tend to be younger 
and better off than other customers (PFRC, 2013). 
The reasons for using HCSTC options also vary 
between the types of service. Overall, loans are 
commonly used to cover living expenses, vehicle 
expenses, and general shopping, usually as a 
result of an unexpected increase in expenses or 
outgoings. Payday borrowers are more likely to use 
their loans to cover the costs of living, including car 
expenses (Rowlingson et al, 2014). Those who use 
pawnbrokers are more likely to use the money for 
covering household bills, and those who use home 
credit are more likely to do so to access bigger sums 
to cover Christmas and birthdays (Edmonds, 2018).
The regulation of the commercial high cost credit 
has tightened significantly since FCA took over 
regulation of the sector in 2014. This followed 
growing public disquiet around the cost of payday 
loans and a strong lobby from parliamentarians 
and pressure groups to tighten regulation. In 2015, 
FCA introduced several regulatory caps to the 
payday lending market, to protect customers from 
excessive charges. The new regulations introduced:
 an initial cost cap of 0.8% per day;
 default fees capped at £15 (protects borrowers 
struggling to repay);
 and a total cost cap of 100%, to protect 
customers from escalating debts (Edmonds, 
2018).
In 2016, further regulation was introduced 
whereby payday lenders were also required to 
subscribe to a price comparison website to ensure 
customers can effectively research companies 
before taking out a loan. Alongside the tightened 
regulation came greater scrutiny in those forms of 
high cost credit where a cap was not introduced. 
This greater scrutiny also changed lender 
behaviour, having significant impacts on the home 
credit and RTO sectors, both of who regularly 
reported and monitored the FCA increased scrutiny 
within their annual report and investor analyst 
presentations.
As a result of the tightening of regulation, many 
high cost lending firms have since left the market. 
The number of payday lenders dropped to 144 in 
2016, from 400 in 2014 (Smith, 2017) to 40-50 
today.6 As well as this, following the introduction 
of the price cap, the cost of loans in the market 
has decreased, as has the number of customers 
being charged late fees. This has been as a result 
of many lenders choosing not charge late fees, as 
well as there being a reduction in late payments 
by customers. There has also been a reduction in 
the number of extensions and rollovers on payday 
6 https://www.paydaybadcredit.co.uk/payday-loans-industry-worth-
uk-2018/
Table 2.3: Customer characteristics by type of credit 
Payday 
loans
Home 
credit
Catalogue 
credit
Rent-to-
own
Guarantor 
loans
Logbook
Median annual 
income
£20,000 £15,500 £17,700 £16,100 £20,800 £23,300
Median 
outstanding 
personal debt
£3,600 £2,800 £1,300 £4,300 £7,400 £7,600
Median credit 
score
42 41 63 35 40 32
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loans, and there has a been a decrease in the 
average number of new loans taken out by HCSTC 
customers, from 6 in 2013 to 4 in 2017 (FCA, 
2017). Overall, it can be said that those customers 
who still use these forms of credit pay less for it 
than they did before 2014. 
On April 1st, 2019, the FCA introduced a price cap 
on the RTO sector, which included: 
 Setting a total credit cap of 100%;
 Introducing a requirement that firms must 
benchmark product base prices (including 
delivery and installation but excluding add-ons) 
against retail prices;
 Preventing firms increasing their prices for 
other goods and services sold within an RTO 
agreement;
Alongside this, the FCA has introduced a ban on 
making the sale of extended warranties at the 
point of sale of the RTO agreement. The RTO 
industry had been in decline for several years prior 
to the announcement of the RTO cap. The principal 
players have either changed their business model, 
closed branches or entered administration. The 
main retailer BrightHouse has been unable to 
pay off its creditors and has closed branches and 
altered the customer demographic away from 
“higher risk” to “less risky” borrowers. 
2.4. Other affordable credit 
 providers: credit unions
Credit unions also offer an ethical alternative 
to high cost, short-term credit. Credit unions are 
mutual financial institutions that provide savings, 
loans and a range of services to its members. 
They are owned and controlled by their members, 
who share a common bond, usually geographical, 
associational or occupational. The core purpose of 
the credit unions is to encourage members to save, 
create sources of credit for the benefit of members 
at a fair interest rate, use members’ savings 
for mutual benefit and, in some cases, provide 
financial education (Cadywould, 2016).
In the UK, credit union numbers grew from 
81 in 1982 to 389 in 2012 (Weaver, 2015). In 
2014, the number had reduced to 362, although 
membership and assets have doubled and trebled 
respectively in that time, suggesting consolidation 
in the market leaving fewer but larger lenders 
(Cadywould, 2016). Membership increased from 
14,000 to over 890,000 between 1989 and 
2012, and by 2014 was at 1.2m (Weaver, 2015). 
Despite their growth in reach, credit union market 
penetration has remained low in comparison to 
international standards (Weaver, 2015).
Table 2.4 presents some more recent statistics on 
the credit union sector.
Data from the Bank of England statistical returns 
from credit unions suggest that the process of 
consolidation and growth has continued. The 
number of credit union returns across England, 
Scotland and Wales fell from 360 in 2014 to 
just under 300 in 2017. At the same time, the 
number of adult members increased from around 
1m to 1.2m. Levels of credit union membership 
remains low, especially in England and Wales, 
internationally. The adult credit union membership 
in England is equivalent to around 2% of the adult 
population and 3.4% in Wales. Scotland has higher 
levels of credit union membership of around 11% 
of the adult population. In comparison, the 108m 
credit union members in the US make up over 30% 
of the population. In Ireland, over 70% of the 
population are members of a credit union.
Lending also appears to have increased as indicated 
by the number and value of outstanding loans. The 
value of outstanding loans increased from £690m to 
over £840m and the number of loans from 360,000 
to 370,000. The average value of outstanding loans 
across the three countries is £2,200. 
These are significant numbers of loans and 
members. In comparison, the CDFIs in this sample 
have a combined personal loan portfolio just shy 
of £20m. The growth of credit unions has partly 
been a result of the funding received through the 
DWP-led Financial Inclusion Growth Fund, along 
with a greater public awareness campaign to 
widen membership. The funding was designed to 
help them to build capacity, invest in infrastructure 
and to subsidise lending to vulnerable groups 
(nef, 2008). Despite this, credit unions are not 
necessarily well positioned to provide immediate 
access to small loans at scale. This is because they 
are set up to lend to people they know, with a track 
record of saving, lending members’ savings restrict 
16    Scaling up the UK personal lending CDFI sector
Table 2.4: Credit unions England, Wales and Scotland ’14-’17
2014 2015 2016 2017
Adult members (‘000)
England
Scotland
Wales
Total
719
315
59
1,093
772
328
62
1,162
787
399
68
1,254
738
399
65
1,202
Value outstanding loans
England
Scotland
Wales
Total
£405m
£266m
£18m
£689m
£434m
£280m
£20m
£734m
£465m
£300m
£23m
£788m
£501m
£320m
£23m
£844m
Number outstanding loans (‘000)
England
Scotland
Wales
Total
238
110
16
364
243
111
18
372
245
111
16
372
238
119
16
373
Staff members employed
England
Scotland
Wales
Total
1,122
385
130
1,637
1,156
385
144
1,685
1,209
444
141
1,794
1,165
409
146
1,720
Number credit union returns
England
Scotland
Wales
Total
233
107
19
359
218
104
19
341
200
98
19
317
181
94
17
292
Source: Bank of England Credit Union annual statistics
the level of risk they can take and because their 
lending is restricted by the interest rate cap (at 3% 
per month or 42.6% APR). As a result, credit union 
members, especially borrowers, tend to be more 
diverse and better-off segment than CDFIs. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3.
2.5. CDFI government policy 
 and funding
Government policy areas relevant to the CDFI 
sector are focussed around access to bank 
accounts, affordable credit, protection via 
insurance and building financial resilience through 
savings. CDFIs open bank accounts for customers 
and generally insist on them being used to 
repay loans either weekly, fortnightly, 4-weekly 
or monthly. They provide affordable loans and 
several CDFIs also offer linked savings accounts in 
partnership with credit unions and banks. One has 
begun to offer a linked Home Contents Insurance 
policy with a leading Insurance company. Many 
have relationships in place with free debt and 
money advice organisations or offer benefit 
checker or grant finder solutions before a loan 
advance is made. 
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Government support for the sector has been 
uneven over the years. The government provided 
nearly £80m in capital and revenue funding for 
the affordable credit sector, including CDFIs, 
between 2004 and 2011 through the Financial 
Inclusion Fund. A hiatus in financial inclusion and 
affordable credit policy and funding followed until 
2017. Since then Government has appointed a 
minister responsible for financial inclusion, set up 
a financial inclusion policy forum and setup a new 
fund utilising bank’s dormant assets support the 
scaling of affordable credit alternatives, which will 
include CDFIs.
Although it closed in 2011, it is important to 
understand the Growth Fund, as it had important 
legacy impacts for the sector. In 2004, the 
Government launched their financial inclusion 
strategy, which was backed by a £120m Financial 
Inclusion Fund. The aim of this fund was to 
increase access to bank accounts, affordable 
credit and free money advice between 2005 and 
2008 (HM Treasury, 2007). In 2006, the Financial 
Inclusion Fund introduced a £42m initiative- the 
DWP’s Growth Fund – which provided support 
across three areas: 
 Loan capital to third sector parties, such as 
credit unions and CDFIs, to lend to financially 
excluded households; 
 Revenue to Growth Fund lenders to support the 
delivery of loans, covering administrative and 
staff costs and; 
 Funding to develop the capacity of third sector 
lenders.
The Financial Inclusion Fund was renewed in 2008 
until 2011, providing a further £130m. As a result, 
the Growth Fund received further support of £38m 
during this time. Between 2006 and 2012, the 
Growth Fund: 
 supported credit unions and CDFIs with £113m, 
which led to 317,798 Growth Fund loans being 
issued with a total value of over £137m;
 mean amount borrowed by successful 
applicants was around £478 (Collard et al, 
2011).
During this time, the Growth Fund provided CDFIs 
with lending capital and an effective operating 
subsidy that enabled them to expand their 
outreach. Moneyline, for example, opened 12 new 
branches in this time (Evans et al, 2018) often 
to address the mismatch of credit need and lack 
of supply identified in Experian’s geographical 
mapping of supply and demand. Amongst Growth 
Fund borrowers, loans issued through the Growth 
Fund made up 55% of individuals’ borrowing 
(Collard et al, 2011). An important legacy of the 
Fund is that it provided several personal lending 
CDFIs with a capital base, as DWP bequeathed the 
remaining loan capital to the CDFIs provided they 
use it in the spirit of the Financial Inclusion Fund.
In 2019, the UK government announced it would 
direct £55m of funding from dormant accounts, 
aimed specifically at tackling financial exclusion (in 
England). Fair4All was founded in February 2019 
to support the financial wellbeing of people in 
vulnerable circumstances by increasing access to 
fair, affordable and appropriate financial products 
and services. Their initial focus is supporting the 
growth and support of alternatives to high cost 
credit, through debt, equity and grant investments 
supporting new, as well as existing organisations. 
Fair4All will also work to build partnerships with 
other relevant organisations in the area (such 
as the Financial Inclusion Commission and the 
End High Cost Credit Alliance). Work is currently 
underway on their first strategy, centred on 
improving access to credit, and the distribution 
of funds will start towards the end of 2019. In 
July 2019, Fair4All announced it would be piloting 
forms of support with five affordable credit 
providers, including three CDFIs. 
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3.1. Introduction
This chapter looks at the performance and 
achievements of the personal lending CDFI sector 
to date. There are two dimensions that have come 
to define the sector and are important to keep in 
mind when considering the performance of the 
sector. The first is the social dimension, referring 
to the ability to reach those most excluded that 
even credit unions cannot reach through mobilising 
deposits, including commercial high cost credit 
customers as well as generating positive outcomes 
for this group (e.g. increased disposable income 
etc.). The second is the financial dimension and 
refers to the ability to offer loans and operate 
in an operationally sustainable manner at scale 
with limited or no subsidy. The chapter draws 
on the analysis of financial data collected for 
2013/14-2016/17 and interviews with CDFI 
management, board members, investors, experts 
and Government.
The quantitative analysis in the chapter uses 
several key statistical terms:
• Mean: This refers to the arithmetic mean and is 
calculated by dividing the total by the number 
of CDFIs in the sample. The mean is susceptible 
to influence of the so-called outliers and gives 
equal weight to all providers regardless of size.
• Weighted mean: We have calculated this 
mean by weighting it by the outstanding 
personal loan portfolio of the CDFIs. The 
weighted mean more accurately portrays 
performance of the overall sector.
• Median: The median is the middle value of 
an ordered sample. It better describes typical 
values when there are outliers or a skewed 
distribution. 
• Standard deviation: The standard deviation 
is a measure of variation in the sample. In 
normally distributed data, 68% of the data is 
within one standard deviation of the mean and 
95% within two standard deviations. A high 
standard deviation suggests greater variation 
around the mean. For example, if the mean age 
is 50, a standard deviation of 25 would suggest 
high level of variation, as 68% of the sample 
would be between 25 and 75. Conversely, a 
standard deviation of 5 would indicate that the 
responses are clustered around the mean (i.e. 
68% within 45 and 55 years).
The chapter is organised as follows. We start 
by describing and discussing the CDFIs in the 
sample, including size, origins, structure and 
strategies (Section 3.2.). Section 3.3 analyses the 
characteristics of the customers and customer 
outcomes. Section 3.4 details the loan portfolio 
growth and development. Sections 3.5 and 
3.6 analyses the CDFIs in terms of financial 
sustainability, and efficiency and productivity. 
Finally, section 3.7 considers the capacity for 
growth drawing on an analysis of their balance 
sheets and on interviews with stakeholders. 
3. Social and financial 
achievements of the sector
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3.2. Participating CDFIs
Seven out of the ten personal lending CDFIs in the 
UK took part in this study. The table below provides 
some key data on the sample.
At the time of collecting the data, the sample had 
an outstanding portfolio of around £20m and 
nearly 43,000 active clients. Judged exclusively 
on their number of employees, the participating 
CDFIs can be classed as SMEs. They had 
nearly 260 staff and 31 branches. Three of the 
participating CDFIs can be classed as medium 
firms, two are small and two are micro.
The participating CDFIs started operating in the 
personal lending market between 2001 and 2007. 
Some of the CDFIs were set up prior to this but 
only started making personal loans subsequently. 
The mean number of years in the personal lending 
market is 14 years. With two exceptions (Street 
UK, PfP), the CDFIs were set up, often with local 
partners, to address financial exclusion in the local 
area. Three were set up (Moneyline, CWRT and Fair 
Finance) based on the model developed by Dayson 
and colleagues (Dayson et al, 1999). Two were set 
up by social enterprises and were engaged in other 
activities and areas (Street UK, Five Lamps), whilst 
two were set up by local government and social 
housing landlords to serve a particular market 
(Scotcash, PfP).
All seven CDFIs are asset locked, mission driven 
firms. None have private shareholders or profit 
distribution. Their mission statements invariably 
focus on providing affordable loans in a responsible 
manner to low-income households without access 
to mainstream finance to deliver positive impacts 
on their lives. Some statements refer to wider 
services, such as basic bank accounts, advice and 
savings. Beyond their mission statements, there 
are underlying philosophical differences between 
the participating CDFIs about their purpose, social 
goal and strategy. These are namely whether the 
focus should on delivering loans at scale at the 
lowest possible cost to customer, or on providing 
ancillary, more costly services and support to 
increase impact on customers. 
The participating CDFIs largely serve cities and 
bigger towns in the UK, including Scotland, South 
Wales, the North of England, London and the 
West Midlands. Most CDFIs are local or regional 
actors (perhaps except for PfP, which is nominally 
national by serving PfP tenants, although there 
are outlier loans distributed beyond the principal 
operating towns or cities). There are few examples 
of overlap between CDFIs (e.g. Moneyline and 
Street both have branches in Birmingham), though 
the emergence of online and telephone-based 
lending is bringing some CDFIs into competition 
with each other. 
2016/17 Total Mean Weighted 
mean
Number of employees 259 37 56
Branches 31 5 7
Active clients 42,906 6,129 9,680
Outstanding portfolio personal £19.7m £2.8m £4.5m
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Most CDFIs provide a mix of products (see table 
below). 
Three of the CDFIs (PfP, Moneyline and Scotcash) 
only provide financial services aimed at the 
personal market. Three also provide business loans 
(Five Lamps, Fair Finance and CWRT). Two provide 
non-financial services to other businesses and 
organisations (Five Lamps and Street UK). Except 
for one CDFI (CWRT), the personal lending makes 
up most of the outstanding portfolio.
The participating CDFIs are constituted as 
companies limited by guarantees, limited 
companies or community benefit societies (what 
used to be known as the Industrial Provident 
Societies) and are unable to hold equity in a 
traditional sense, although one has altered its 
structure to allow it to take non-transferable equity 
shares. There is one exception (Five Lamps), which 
is set up as a company limited by shares and 
whose equity is 100% held by the parent charity. 
Almost none of the participating CDFIs can be 
considered as standalone personal lenders. Three 
are wholly owned subsidiaries (PfP FS, Street UK 
and Five Lamps). A further three are CDFIs that 
offer multiple services (Fair Finance, Scotcash and 
CWRT). This is an important observation for two 
reasons. First, it enables some of the providers to 
cross-subsidise the lending activity with surplus 
from other activities. Second, where the personal 
lending arm is not audited separately, it distorts 
efficiency and cost measures. 
The CDFIs’ growth ambitions and strategies differ 
in three respects:
• Level of ambition: The CDFIs differ in level 
of ambition in terms of how envisioned growth 
rates compare with current/historical growth 
rates, the impact on the CDFI over the period 
(e.g. CDFI doubling/tripling in size) and how the 
growth compares with the vision for reaching 
£200m by 2027. Two CDFIs either do not intend 
to grow or have no explicit goal to grow. The 
remaining CDFIs have growth ambitions ranging 
from a steady annual growth in line with historic 
growth to a fourfold growth in the next three to 
five years significantly exceeding current growth 
rates.
Participating 
CDFIs
Personal 
loans
Savings1 Business 
loans
Money 
advice
B2B 
services2
Moneyline
Scotcash
Street UK
PfP
Five Lamps
Fair Finance
CWRT
Notes: 
1  Provided in partnership with bank or credit union; 
2 Refers to services provided to other organisations and businesses, including public sector
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• Existence of a strategy: Some of the CDFIs 
express their growth ambitions in general terms, 
though most operate with growth targets or 
projections accompanied by growth strategy 
covering funding, route to market and business 
model.
• Need for external capital: Linked to the level 
of ambition, two of the CDFIs do not currently 
use and do not plan to use external capital to 
grow. The remaining CDFIs are seeking external 
funding to realise envisioned growth.
A strategy for growth must consider three key 
issues: how they are going to reach the market 
(route to market), the sustainability of the 
model (funding model) and how to obtain the 
capital (and in what form) to increase lending 
(capitalisation). The table below lists past 
and current growth strategies pursued by the 
participating CDFIs.
The CDFIs have and are pursuing various growth 
strategies. In terms of routes to market, most of 
the CDFIs are working on the transition to an 
online and digital marketplace. Five of the CDFIs 
have an online offering and a sixth operates 
with telephone-based lending. Only one of the 
CDFIs reported having explicit plans to open new 
branches in the coming years. Most of the CDFI 
board members and management interviewed 
believed that branch-based expansion would not 
be a viable growth strategy for several reasons:
• Associated costs: There are significant overhead 
costs associated with opening and running a 
branch. It is estimated that it takes a minimum 
three years for a branch to break even. 
• Changing consumer habits and preferences: 
The CDFIs recognise that consumers are 
increasingly wanting and (some would say) 
demanding to interact online, though some 
customer groups still prefer face-to-face 
interaction.
• Limited capacity: Unlike an online platform, a 
branch has a ceiling on the number of loans and 
customers it can generate. Our data suggests 
that the outstanding portfolio per branch ranges 
from less than £10,000 to nearly £1m. This 
reflects the diversity of the branches in terms of 
maturity and location. The mean is just shy of 
£400,000 and the median is around £370,000. 
However, CDFIs identified several challenges 
associated with moving online:
• Meeting customer expectations: Online 
customers have expectations for the whole 
process to be online and seamless, an end-to-
end 24/7 process, including the underwriting, 
decision-making and communication, which 
often exceeds the ability of the provider.
• Appropriate decision-engine: The participating 
CDFIs have lacked the financial resources to 
invest in the R&D to produce discrete decision-
engines dealing with customer groups with 
thin credit files and those operating in cash. In 
some cases, moving online resulted in rejecting 
previous branch-based customers and high 
proportion of applications requiring manual 
intervention. One CDFI reported that only 5% of 
decisions were fully automated. 
Routes to market Funding model Capitalisation
Direct (F2F, remote)
Opening new branches
Expanding remote channels
Indirect
Comparison websites
Partnership model
White label model
Diversification
Sustainable pricing structure
Efficient delivery model
Delivering on policy objectives
Recycling existing capital
Strengthening balance sheet
Social investment
Commercial borrowing
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• Higher debt levels: Several CDFIs experienced 
increased levels of arrears on introducing online 
lending. CDFI managers identified several 
potential explanations: an online customer is 
more likely to have loans with multiple providers; 
the time needed to get a decision-engine right; 
and loan delinquency management made more 
difficult by the move from relationship-based 
lending and a more geographically disbursed 
customer base. In addition, the data provide by 
the CDFIs generally suggest that the level of 
repeat borrowing is lower for online than branch-
based origination. Arrears levels are generally 
higher for new than repeat lending.
• Lower repeat and conversion rate: CDFIs 
generally have to work harder for each customer 
online, as repeat borrowing and conversation 
rate is lower than in branch. Typically, conversion 
rate for branch-based applications is around 
50-60% compared with around 10% for online 
applications.
• Marketing costs: Marketing and customer 
acquisition costs are significantly higher for 
loans originated online compared with branch. 
According to data and information provided by 
the participating CDFIs, the marketing spend 
per loan is more than four times greater for 
online compared with branch loans. Managers 
and board members interviewed suggested that 
simply offering a lower rate than commercial 
high cost credit providers was not enough to 
attract customers. Instead, ease of use, speed 
of decision-making and visibility were often 
more important for customers. The CDFIs have 
experimented with several approaches, including 
white label online portals (e.g. Sheffield Money), 
price comparison websites (Affordable Lending 
platform) and direct marketing (e.g. social 
media campaigns, TV advertising etc.). Based 
on loan originations generated by each channel, 
direct marketing has been more successful than 
platforms and portals. The platforms do not 
currently offer a seamless, integrated access 
for applicants and can be cumbersome for the 
participating CDFIs.
Additionally, the move to online and telephone-
based lending brings CDFIs increasingly in 
competition with each other, because they start 
providing loans at a national scale. Anecdotally, 
one CDFI reported significant online presence in 
area where another CDFI has a branch. 
The CDFIs with ambitions to scale up recognised 
that this required moving towards greater financial 
sustainability through different mechanisms:
• Remote delivery: The CDFIs saw delivering 
parts or all of their services remotely as an 
important element of a sustainable model due 
to the financial costs and capacity constraints 
associated with opening branches. Most foresaw 
retaining all or most of their branches but for 
telephone and online lending to be the main 
source of lending in the future. 
• Pricing: The CDFIs with aspirations to grow set 
their pricing to be financially sustainable. The 
remaining CDFIs faced internal restrictions, such 
as political and reputational considerations, to 
increasing rates or operated on a very small 
scale.
• Diversification: Two of the CDFIs generated 
significant income from other sources than 
lending. One explicitly pursued a strategy of 
diversification to subsidise its lending activity. 
The other saw the personal lending activity 
as a standalone activity not requiring cross-
subsidisation, though it recognised that the 
assets of the other parts of the business 
strengthened its overall balance sheet.
• Efficient customer journey: Most of the CDFIs 
had been making changes to the customer 
journey, including open banking, downloading 
electronic bank statements, online pre-
application and electronic signature of contract.
The CDFIs saw the pursuit of financial 
sustainability as largely conditioned by the context 
in which they operated. In the absence of long-
term, patient, low cost capital and significant 
grant funding, four of the CDFIs relied on external 
borrowing. The remaining CDFIs relied on the 
recycling of existing capital and grant funding to 
finance their loan capital. 
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Table 3.1: Customer characteristics participating CDFIs and credit unions (%)
Credit Unions1 Participating CDFIs
Unemployed
Social Housing tenants
Benefits Recipients 
Women
Hh income less than £15,000
Single parents
9
27
–
–
352
6
48
57
69
72
55
46
Table 3.2: Wellbeing measures (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17
Reduced financial stress
Improved happiness
Improved health
Improved confidence
50%
69%
27%
62%
50%
61%
22%
53%
52%
-
-
-
N 4 4 2
1 Martin, C. (2018) Use of credit and financial resilience. Analysis of the Scottish Household Survey Ipsos MORI Scotland & Carnegie Trust
2 < £20,000, not £15,000
3.3. Customer outreach and outcomes
Personal lending CDFIs aim to “serve those caught 
between market failure and exploitative lenders” 
(CDFA, 2010) and often serve marginalised 
groups. They can be said to lend to those facing 
multiple disadvantages either by virtue of place 
or other characteristics. Traditionally they have 
served women, unemployed people, social 
renters, and those in receipt of welfare support. 
Table 3.1 compared customer characteristics of 
the participating CDFIs with customers of credit 
unions. This is a relevant comparison, as CDFIs are 
often seen to be uniquely placed to serve the most 
vulnerable households. We have used the 2016/17 
data for the participating CDFIs.
The participating CDFIs serve a more vulnerable 
market proportionately compared with credit 
unions, not necessarily by volume. Nearly half of 
the CDFI customers are unemployed compared 
to just under 10% of credit union customers, and 
30% more CDFI customers live in social housing. 
Nearly half of CDFI customers are single parents 
compared with 6% of credit union customers. In 
2018, Responsible Finance reported that: 
• 23,230 customers had used a high cost lender 
in the last year
• 14,740 customers were helped to pay bills, 
existing debts and for emergencies
• 19,310 customers were supported in paying for 
special and unexpected events
There are three features of personal lending CDFIs 
that may generate positive customer outcomes: 
they lend in a responsible manner, lending only 
what customers can repay; they provide ancillary 
services, namely opening linked savings accounts 
and bank accounts for customers; and they charge 
a considerably lower interest rate to customers 
compared with comparable commercial high cost 
lenders. We hypothesise that these features may 
translate into the following customer outcomes: 
overall improved wellbeing; increased disposable 
income; and improved financial resilience. Here we 
draw on data collated from the CDFIs to estimate 
the social impact of the sector for the period 
2013/14-16/17 in these three outcome areas. 
Table 3.2 shows some measures of improved 
wellbeing collected by some of the CDFIs.
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Not all the participating CDFIs measure wellbeing 
in their reports. Many use interview data to 
demonstrate the positive changes the support has 
had to their customers’ lives. For the CDFIs that 
have included wellbeing, many use a reduction 
in financial related stress and improved financial 
skills, confidence and self-esteem as their measure. 
Other measures included improved happiness and 
improved health. On most of the measures, most 
clients reported improved wellbeing. The greatest 
increase was in overall happiness, whilst only 
around a quarter reported improvements in health.
CDFIs can make an important contribution to 
reducing the poverty premium faced by low-
income households by charging a lower interest 
rate than commercial high cost credit providers. We 
calculate this by estimating the proportion of CDFI 
customers that stop using commercial high cost 
credit. This figure is taken from the Responsible 
Finance’s annual survey (the 2014 and 2016 report 
on the number of customers that have stopped 
borrowing). For the remaining two years, we have 
used data from a longitudinal survey conducted of 
CDFI customers in 2009 (Dayson et al, 2010). We 
then multiply this by the difference in price for a 
home credit and online high cost loan respectively. 
Table 3.3 shows the calculation of the 
displacement of commercial high cost credit 
providers.
The data suggests that the CDFIs have reduced 
the financing costs for its new customers of 
£400,000 – £500,000 for home credit and 
£500,000 – £600,000 for an online equivalent. 
The average savings per customer replacing high 
cost credit with a CDFI loan ranges from £150 to 
over £220. 
The CDFIs can play a potentially important role in 
improving the financial resilience of households. 
The most direct way they can do this is by 
opening savings accounts for customers and 
encouraging them to save. Two CDFIs offer linked 
savings accounts with banks or credit unions. 
We estimate the net increase in the number of 
households saving as a result of this intervention 
Table 3.3: Impact of participating CDFIs on displacement high cost credit (2013/14-16/17)
13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17
# new customers 7,177 8,424 8,137 10,038
% CDFI customers using commercial HCC 41%1 27%2 38%1 27%2
# CDFI customers stop using commercial HCC 2,943 2,225 3,092 2,710
Reduced financing costs3
Provident
Satsuma
£482,958
£660,388
£343,955
£481,189
£470,207
£663,575
£425,067
£597,782
Reduced financing costs per new customer
Provident
Satsuma
£164
£224
£155
£216
£152
£215
£157
£221
N 7 7 7 7
1 Based on figures from the Responsible Finance Industry survey
2 Based on data reported in Dayson et al (2010)
3 Calculated for a £500 loan repayable over 12 months
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by subtracting an estimated proportion that would 
have saved anyway (drawing on propensity to save 
among low income households). 
Table 3.4 shows the estimated increase in savings.
The data indicates that the CDFI sector plays 
an important role in improving the resilience of 
customers. We estimate that between 800 and 
1,600 customers that otherwise would not save 
start saving as a result of the CDFIs opening 
accounts for and encouraging them to save. 
This leads to an increase in the level of savings 
of between £370,000 and £760,000. This may 
lead to reduced reliance on local support services 
and the welfare system, such as the social fund. 
Savings might also enable households to take a 
more planned approach to borrowing by reducing 
the need to resort to loans to cover emergency 
expenses.
3.4. Loan portfolio growth 
 and development
This section focuses on the size, nature and 
development of the personal loan portfolio of 
the participating CDFIs. The CDFIs in the sample 
provide short- term unsecured loans of a value of 
£400-£800 for consumption purposes at an APR 
ranging from around 75% to 250%. One of the 
CDFIs also offers a flexible credit product similar to 
an overdraft. 
Chart 3.1 shows the number of personal loans and 
active clients (right axis) and the value of personal 
lending (left axis) issued by six of the participating 
CDFIs for the years 14/15 to 16/17.
Lending increased over this period. The amount 
lent increased from £18.4m to £21.9m, equivalent 
to nearly 20% growth. Similarly, the number of 
loans increased from over 36,000 to nearly 44,000 
or around 20%. The number of active clients (i.e. a 
Table 3.4: Increased financial resilience (2013/14-16/17)
13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17
# customers opening savings 
accounts
2,154 1,723 3,054 1,954
Amount saved per customers (£)* £467 £467 £467 £467
Total amount saved by customers (£) £1,005,916 £804,641 £1,426,518 £912,518
% that did not save previously**
Low
High
50%
59%
46%
57%
44%
53%
44%
53%
Net increase in # households saving
Low
High
1,077
1,271
793
982
1,344
1,619
860
1,053
Net increase in # amount of savings
Low
High
£502,959
£593,557
£370,331
£458,594
£627,648
£756,073
£401,620
£491,751
N 2 2 2 2
*Estimated based on data from one CDFI; **Based on proportion of three lowest income brackets with no savings using the savings and assets survey
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borrower with an outstanding amount) increased 
by only 3% from around 42,000 to 43,000. This 
difference in growth suggests that a significant 
proportion of loans were issued to existing rather 
than new customers. 
Table 3.5 displays the average amount lent by the 
CDFIs for the period.
The median and mean amount lent was around 
£560-570 in 2016/17 with average amount 
lent ranging from £270 to £800 among the 
participating CDFIs. This is surprisingly high. 
In comparison, the 2017 Responsible Finance 
survey reports that the average amount lent by 
personal lending CDFIs is £400. The mean for the 
aggregate data (i.e. dividing the total amount lent 
by the number of loans) is around £500. Two of 
the CDFIs, and one in particular, lend significantly 
larger amounts than the other CDFIs, driving up 
the average. Furthermore, the CDFIs have high 
levels of repeat borrowing. Drawing on data from 
five of the CDFIs, the level of repeat borrowing is 
very high (typically 60-70%). Repeat borrowers 
tend to borrow larger amounts. The mean size of a 
first-time loan is just shy of £400 and the median is 
£360, significantly lower than the average.
Table 3.5: Mean amount lent (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
Standard Deviation
£597
£537
£488
£198
£580
£546
£504
£154
£557
£556
£573
£183
N 6 6 6
Chart 3.1: Lending by CDFIs 14/15-16/17
£23,000,000
£22,000,000
£21,000,000
£20,000,000
£19,000,000
£18,000,000
£17,000,000
£16,000,000
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
14/15 15/16 16/17
 Loans disbursed (£)            Loans disbursed (#)             Active borrowers (#)
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3.5. Sustainability
Financial sustainability has become an increasingly 
important aim for the sector. Since the end 
of Growth Fund II in 2011, there has been no 
central government capital or revenue funding for 
affordable credit. More generally, central and local 
government funding has been increasingly scarce 
since the financial crisis and austerity. Moreover, 
the costs of subsidising loan interest rates are 
prohibitive. Sustainability generally refers to the 
ability of providers to cover costs with interest 
rate and fee income from borrowers and other 
operating income but without subsidies.
We start by looking at the aggregate income 
statement for the participating CDFIs for the 
period (table 3.6).
The immediate observation we can make is 
that the bottom line for the participating CDFIs 
improved. The deficit before donations fell by 40% 
from £1.1m to £0.7m, whilst the deficit of £460,000 
after donations turned into a small surplus of 
around £80,000 by 2016/17. This was largely 
accounted for by an increase of around £700,000 
in donations and non-operating income. 
The growth in interest and fee income, of around 
£2m, outstripped the growth in operating 
costs, around £1m. Other operating income fell 
significantly by nearly £2m. This reflects a greater 
focus on personal lending as the main activity 
among the CDFIs and suggests that this activity is 
increasing its sustainability.
Table 3.6: Aggregate CDFI income statement (£000)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Interest/fee income on loans £7,905 £9,252 £9,925 26%
Interest/fee income on 
investments
£77 £80 £62 -20%
Other financial income £20 £129 £1,102 5,400%
Financial expenses £667 £785 £807 21%
Net financial income £7,335 £8,675 £10,281 40%
Other operating income £2,875 £1,485 £938 -67%
Operating expenses £9,620 £9,647 £10,627 11%
Net loan provision expense £1,756 £1,507 £1,891 8%
Non-operating income £0 £213 £584 100%
Net income before donations -£1,165 -£781 -£714 -38%
Donations in cash £707 £559 £791 12%
Net income after donations -£458 -£222 £77 83%
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In this section, we will look at two dimensions of 
sustainability (Table 3.7). 
First, we calculate the ability of providers to 
cover costs with income generated from the loan 
portfolio (financial income). The greater the ability 
to do this the less the CDFIs have to rely on grant 
or other trading income. The ratio will also be 
lower for CDFIs that deliver other services but do 
not separate out the associated costs. Second, we 
calculate the ability of CDFIs to cover costs with 
income generated from the loan portfolio and 
other trading activities (but not grant income). This 
measures the sustainability of CDFIs that pursue 
this through diversification or cross-subsidising 
lending activity.
Table 3.8 shows the sustainability measures only 
taking into account financial income. 
The participating CDFIs’ ability to cover 
operating costs and bad debts with financial 
income increased from 14/15 to 16/17. Both the 
level of operational and financial sustainability 
improved between 10 and 18% depending on 
the measurement. Six out of the seven CDFIs 
improve their operational sustainability ratio. Four 
improve their level of sustainability by increasing 
interest income, by more than operating expenses 
and bad debt, whilst two significantly cut costs 
and bad debt. When we weight the data by the 
CDFIs’ share of personal lending, operational and 
financial sustainability are higher and increases 
by a greater rate than the simple mean, reflecting 
that larger providers are outperforming smaller 
CDFIs. This might suggest economy of scales 
effects. 
The level of operational sustainability for the latest 
year ranges from around 60% to over 100%. One 
CDFI has operational sustainability ratio over 
100% throughout the period, meaning that it 
covers all its operating costs (excluding financing 
costs) with income from the loan portfolio. The 
CDFIs receiving grants and engaged in other 
trading activities generally display lower rates than 
those that exclusively do personal lending. Other 
sources of income are decreasing over the period 
from nearly £3m to £1m. 
Table 3.7: Sustainability measures
Financial income Financial & operating 
income
Operating costs Operational sustainability Operational sustainability plus
Operating & financing costs Financial sustainability Financial sustainability plus
Table 3.8: Operational and financial sustainability (%)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Operational sustainability
Mean
Weighted mean
72
76
85
88
82
90
14%
18%
Financial sustainability
Mean
Weighted mean
69
72
81
82
78
85
13%
10%
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Table 3.9 shows the extent to which the CDFIs can 
cover their costs drawing on both financial and 
operating income. 
Unsurprisingly the CDFIs can cover a greater 
proportion of costs with operating as well as 
financial income. The percentage of costs covered 
increased from 14/15 to 16/17. The proportion 
of operating costs the CDFIs were able to cover 
without grant ranged from around 60% to 110%. 
Financial sustainability (i.e. taking into account 
financing costs) levels were lower than the level of 
operational sustainability.
3.6. Efficiency and productivity
Efficiency and productivity are intimately linked to 
financial sustainability. Provided loan delinquency 
is kept at sufficiently low levels and the pricing 
structure reflects delivery costs, the more loans 
the CDFIs can generate with each unit of resource 
(staff or otherwise) the more sustainable and 
scalable their model. This is especially important 
for the personal lending CDFI sector where 
amounts are small. In this section, we consider 
measures for both staff and cost-efficiency.
Table 3.10 displays the number and value of 
personal loans disbursed per loan officer in 
2016/17 for six of the CDFIs (one did not submit 
data on value and number of personal loans 
disbursed). One CDFI did not submit historical data 
on the number of loan officers so we only show the 
data for 2016/17.
As indicated by the high standard deviation, there 
was considerable variation in the sample. The loan 
officers of four of the CDFIs originated around 
320-340 loans and £160,000-£250,000 each per 
year. Two of the CDFIs displayed considerably 
higher loan officer productivity rate. One operates 
with a flexible loan product involving additional 
advances to customers, increasing the number 
of loans issued. The second operates exclusively 
with remote underwriting. Conversely the 
remaining CDFIs operated predominantly with F2F 
underwriting at the time. 
Table 3.11 shows the evolution of loan officer 
productivity for the five CDFIs that have provided 
historical data on number of loan officers and 
personal loans disbursed.
Again, the data highlights the variation in the 
sample. Four of the CDFIs increase their loan 
officer productivity in terms of value and number 
over the period, as indicated by the median 
value. The loan officer productivity of the outlier 
CDFI with significantly higher productivity fell 
during the same period making the mean remain 
largely unchanged. The increase in productivity 
is largely a result of rationalisation. The number 
of loan officers for these five CDFIs fell by 15% 
from 101 to 86 from 14/15 to 16/17, whilst the 
number of loans issued decreased by 2% from 
32,445 to 31,737 for the same period. The amount 
lent increased by 14% for the same period as 
some CDFIs lent larger amounts. The increase in 
productivity among most of the CDFIs was due to 
the introduction of online and telephone-based 
lending towards the end of the process as well as 
efficiencies in the customer journey (electronic 
signature, telephone pre-screening etc.).
Table 3.9: Operational and financial sustainability plus (%)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Operational sustainability plus
Mean
Weighted mean
83
98
93
103
87
99
5%
1%
Financial sustainability plus
Mean
Weighted mean
80
93
89
96
83
93
4%
0%
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Table 3.12 details the operating costs incurred 
by the CDFIs for each personal loan disbursed. 
Financing costs and bad debts are not included in 
the calculation.
There is considerable variation in the cost per loan 
across the sample as highlighted by the relatively 
high standard deviation. The cost per loan ranges 
from less than £100 to over £450. There are two 
outliers that explain this variation: one that has a 
flexible loan product (that works like an overdraft), 
which greatly increases the number of loans issued, 
and one that delivers significant other activities but 
did not separate out its personal lending arm for 
the period. The remaining four CDFIs have costs 
per loan ranging from £150 to nearly £400. Still, 
the highest cost per loan among these CDFIs is 
nearly three times greater than the lowest cost per 
loan. Falls in the number of loans issued increased 
the cost per loan. CDFIs which did not separate out 
their lending activities from other activities had a 
greater cost per loan. 
Out of the six CDFIs providing this data, four 
reduced their cost per loan between 10% and 
nearly 50% from 14/15 to 16/17. One of these 
CDFIs achieved a reduction in cost per loan due 
a reduction of 22% in operating expenses. For 
Table 3.10: Loan officer productivity (2016/17)
Mean Weighted Median SD
Number of loans issued 539 652 335 443
Value of loans issued £310,088 £385,818 £188,170 £311,256
Table 3.11: Loan officer productivity (2013/14-16/17)
13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Number of loans
Mean
Weighted mean 
Median
553
632
260
529
595
287
543
594
299
550
577
330
-1%
-8%
27%
Value of loans
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
£257,214
£266,888
£175,332
£278,530
£293,901
£161,920
£291,546
£307,176
£162,743
£345,941
£365,521
£203,555
34%
37%
16%
Table 3.12: Cost per loan (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
SD
£344
£304
£263
£245
£316
£270
£258
£221
£265
£257
£246
£147
-22%
-15%
-7%
-29%
N 6 6 6
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another, the increase was linked to a doubling in 
loans issued linked to the introduction of a flexible 
additional lending product allowing customers to 
take out smaller, multiple loans up to an agreed 
credit limit. For the last two CDFIs, the growth 
in loans disbursed outstripped the growth in 
operating expenses. Two CDFIs experienced 
increases in the cost per loan. For one, the costs 
increased at a greater pace than the loans 
disbursed, whilst another CDFI experienced both a 
fall in lending and an increase in costs.
Table 3.13 shows the operating expense ratio for 
the CDFIs in the sample. This ratio – operating 
expense over total gross outstanding portfolio 
(includes both personal and business) – indicates 
efficiency by measuring the administrative and 
overhead costs incurred to deliver loans. A lower 
ratio suggests a higher level of efficiency.
It is important to note that the ratio is sensitive to 
variations in loan delinquency write-off policy, as 
it affects the gross outstanding portfolio. Some 
of the CDFIs in the sample only write off debt 
when the debtor is deceased, or when all loan 
delinquency procedures have been exhausted. 
Others write off debt when past a certain number 
of days past due. In some cases, we have observed 
significant differences between outstanding loan 
portfolio and loans disbursed for some CDFIs. 
The results suggest that the sector is becoming 
more efficient as the mean, weighted mean and 
median operating expense ratios fell from 14/15 
to 16/17. Three of the CDFIs improved their score 
by between 12 and 21% due to cutting costs and 
increasing lending respectively. Four of the CDFIs 
increased their score suggesting they reduced their 
level of efficiency
In comparison, the average for the MFIs in the 
EMN 2016/17 survey was 34 in 2016 and 26 in 
2017. Around 70% of the MFIs in the survey scored 
below 20 and only 8% were above 50. The Western 
European average was 39 for 2017, which similar to 
the rate of the CDFI in the sample. The reason why 
European MFIs may perform better on this ratio is 
that they are engaged in business lending, resulting 
in larger portfolios, and Western European MFIs 
significant in-kind subsidies, including volunteers and 
free premises, reducing their operating costs. 
3.7. Capacity for growth
This final section will consider the sector and 
participating CDFIs’ capacity to scale up. We 
examine the balance sheets of the participating 
CDFIs and discuss the barriers to growth 
drawing on interviews with CDFI managers and 
stakeholders.
We start by analysing the aggregate balance sheet 
for the participating CDFIs (Table 3.14). The perceived 
strength of the balance sheet influences the sector’s 
ability to attract investment and funding.
The outstanding portfolio makes up most of 
the assets for the participating CDFIs. The loan 
portfolio made up over 70% of the total value of 
assets. This reflects that the CDFIs are primarily 
orientated towards lending and that the CDFIs 
have few fixed assets. This was followed by cash 
and bank deposits, which was 15% of total assets 
in 2016/17, down from 22% in 2014/15. The CDFIs 
have limited value in fixed assets (around £1m or 
4% of total assets) because they do not engage 
in secured lending and do not own any office 
premises or real estate. 
Table 3.13: Operating expense ratio (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
SD
51
48
49
26
49
44
43
25
49
46
45
21
-4
-4
-8%
-19%
N 7 7 7
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Table 3.14: Aggregate CDFI balance sheet (£000)
Assets 14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Cash and bank deposits £5,631 £4,528 £3,460 -39
Short-term financial assets £0 £0 £0 -
Net outstanding portfolio £17,338 £19,276 £17,329 0
Gross portfolio £20,766 £22,131 £21,901 6
(Loan loss reserve) -£3,427 -£3,855 -£4,571 33
Accrued interest £1,104 £794 £1,315 19
Other short-term assets £430 £1,049 £471 10
Long-term financial assets £700 £400 £0 -100
Net fixed assets £828 £1,048 £1,073 30
Other long-term assets £0 £0 £64 100
Total assets £26,234 £27,119 £23,659 -9
Liabilities and equity
Short-term loans £1,719 £3,157 £2,601 50
Other short-term liabilities £3,070 £2,167 £1,880 -39
Long-term loans £12,452 £12,241 £9,577 -23
Total liabilities £18,118 £19,585 £16,548 -9
Paid-in capital £1,180 £1,180 £1,180 -
Reserves £1,540 £1,860 £1,693 10
Total retained earnings £6,272 £6,346 £6,727 -1
Total equity £8,992 £9,387 £9,601 7
Total equity and liabilities £26,234 £27,119 £23,659 -9
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On the liabilities and equity side, liabilities made up 
more of the aggregate balance sheet (£16.6m or 
65%) than equity (£9m or 35%). This is because of 
the limited ability (to date) of CDFIs to take equity. 
Retained earnings made up most of the equity 
(around 68%). Long-term loans make up 72% of 
liabilities and 46% of equity and liabilities.
The balance sheet shrunk slightly over the period. 
The combined assets decreased from £26.2m 
to £23.6m over the period, a decrease of around 
9%. This was accounted for by a £2m decrease 
in cash and bank deposits from £5.6m to £3.4m 
(nearly a 40% fall). The gross portfolio increased 
but this was £20.8m to £21.9m but this was 
cancelled out by a similar increase in loan loss 
reserve. On the liabilities and equity side, there was 
a corresponding fall in liabilities, especially short-
term liabilities.
Efficient and effective assets and liabilities 
management is required by the CDFIs to ensure 
that they can make their financial obligations as 
well as make the most efficient use of assets to 
generate a return. We now turn to the analysis of 
the various ratios and indicators concerning such 
management.
Table 3.15 shows the net portfolio to assets for 
the participating CDFIs. This is a measure of how 
much a provider is allocating to lending. A low 
measure would suggest inefficient use of assets 
or the use of assets for other income generating 
activities, whilst a high measure would indicate 
insufficient liquidity. 
The data shows, as noted above, that the CDFIs 
are allocating most – around 60-70% – of their 
assets to lending. The ratio ranges from around 
40 to over 95. The ones with the lowest scores 
generally tend to have greater liquidity in the form 
of levels of cash or other short-term assets. Three 
of the CDFIs experienced significant growth in this 
ratio. Two grew their loan portfolio considerably, 
whilst one significantly reduced its cash and bank 
deposits.
Table 3.16 shows the equity to assets. This ratio 
is an indicator of solvency and the ability of 
organisations to meet their obligations and absorb 
losses. A higher ratio indicates greater level of 
solvency and ability to absorb losses.
Table 3.15: Net loan portfolio to assets (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
63
68
69
63
69
75
71
75
73
13
10
6
N 7 7 7
Table 3.16: Equity to assets (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
38
16
63
33
21
41
48
30
71
26
88
13
N 6 6 6
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The equity to ratio increased slightly over the period. 
This is because average loan portfolio has decreased, 
whilst the level of equity has remained unchanged. 
One CDFI reported a negative, though improving, 
ratio over the period due to being in negative equity 
due to accumulated losses. Three of the CDFIs 
displayed relatively stable ratios over the period. One 
CDFI significantly improved ratio through reduction 
in value of assets, primarily portfolio, whilst the level 
of equity increased. Another experienced a reduced 
ratio because the portfolio increased whilst the level 
of equity remained stable.
Table 3.17 displays the debt to equity ratio for six 
of the participating CDFIs. (The seventh CDFI 
was a wholly owned subsidiary not retaining 
any earnings or any other form of equity). This 
ratio measures the extent to which the CDFIs 
have leveraged their own funds to finance their 
portfolios. It indicates how much of a cushion 
there is to absorb losses. 
The main takeaway from this table is that the 
level of leverage is low and falling. This is an 
important observation because the CDFIs will 
need significant leverage to achieve a step change 
in growth. The weighted mean and mean values 
range between 0.3 and 0.8 and fell by over 30% in 
the period. The ratio varied significantly between 
individual CDFIs from negative scores to 2.5. Some 
of the CDFIs have very low ratios, close to zero, 
because they do not rely on loans to finance the 
lending activity. One of the CDFIs was also in the 
process of restructuring its liabilities resulting in a 
temporary reduction in liabilities in the period.
This is significantly lower than with community 
finance institutions in comparable contexts. 
For example, in Europe, non-bank microfinance 
institutions had a ratio of 4.1, whilst NGO 
microfinance institutions had a leverage of 2.3. 
There are several explanations for this difference:
• Lack risk sharing mechanisms: There are 
more public risk sharing mechanisms in Europe, 
such as public guarantees, which enables MFIs 
to access more debt finance. There are also 
more public loan schemes, especially on a 
European level, which the sector can access.
• Greater commitment by banking partners: 
The level of commitment from banking 
partners is greater in Europe. Banks provide 
significant amount of debt finance as well as 
other forms of finance.
• Lack junior debt: Some of the CDFIs reported 
that they do not have much additional capacity 
to take on more senior debt. Lenders and 
investors are apprehensive about providing 
junior or subordinated debt.
Table 3.18 displays the financial expense ratio 
for the sample. This ratio measures the total 
interest expense incurred by the CDFI over its loan 
portfolio. It indicates the financial expense incurred 
to fund the portfolio. A higher ratio indicates 
higher financial costs relative to the loan portfolio.
The ratio fell across the sector suggesting a fall in 
financing costs. On average the ratio is 3.6. This 
is below the equivalent ratio for non-bank MFIs 
(7.4) but above NGO MFIs (3.0) in the EU. There is 
considerable variation across the CDFIs. Three of 
the CDFIs have a ratio of zero because they do not 
use debt finance to fund the portfolio. One CDFI 
was reducing its financing costs because it was in 
the process of raising external funding to replace a 
bank loan it had already paid. The three remaining 
CDFIs displayed financial expense ratios ranging 
from 4 to 14. 
Table 3.17: Debt to equity (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
0.5
1.2
0.1
0.5
1.2
0.1
0.3
0.8
0.2
-45
-35
152
N 6 6 6
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The interviews with the CDFI management 
and board members highlighted several factors 
reducing the capacity for growth:
• Deteriorating circumstances for customers: 
Welfare reform and the increasingly precarious 
nature of work had, it was widely agreed, 
resulted in stagnant, uncertain and fluctuating 
incomes, increased consumer debt levels, and 
declining credit scores. This created difficulties 
for CDFIs in serving this group as customers 
were more likely to fall in arrears and require 
greater flexibility in repayment. In some cases, 
the introduction of UC made it more difficult to 
prove loan affordability for female applicants, 
as the payments would often go directly to 
male partner. The CDFIs were also more likely 
to decline loans, even for repeat customers, 
on grounds of affordability and responsible 
lending. 
• Thin management teams: Although investors 
and stakeholders were generally impressed by 
the effectiveness and capacity of the executive 
management, they thought that the CDFIs 
lacked the necessary depth in management 
teams to support the senior management 
teams and boards to drive growth. This meant 
that the executive management and the CEO 
did not have enough capacity to focus on the 
strategic development of the organisations. 
The CDFIs had between one and four senior 
managers with an average of three managers 
(Table 3.20).
• Lack viable mechanisms: All the CDFIs 
currently lack sustainable models to achieve a 
scale up in line with the ambitions set out in this 
report and accepted need for affordable credit. 
On the one hand, branch-based expansion is 
costly and potentially at odds with changing 
customer requirements. On the other, online 
and telephone-based mechanisms require 
considerable investment in marketing and the 
appropriate platforms (e.g. price comparison 
websites etc.). 
• Mismatch funding need and existing supply: 
Interviewees from both CDFIs and investors 
recognised that there was a mismatch between 
the funding needs for CDFIs and the current 
social investment provision. On the demand 
side, CDFIs needed patient low-cost capital to 
invest in systems and key staff. On the supply 
side, there were difficulties in investing in 
CDFIs because of insufficiently strong balance 
sheets, insufficient granularity of reporting and 
monitoring capacity, over-exposure of some 
Table 3.18: Financial expense ratio (2014/15-16/17)
14/15 15/16 16/17 % change
Mean
Weighted mean
Median
4.8
5.3
1.8
3.3
4.5
1.5
3.6
4.5
0.0
-25
-15
-100
N 7 7 7
Table 3.20: Top management in CDFIs (2016/17)
Mean Weighted Median SD
Number of senior managers 3 2.9 2 1.5
% top managers 10.6% 7.4% 9.1% 7.7%
36    Scaling up the UK personal lending CDFI sector
social investors to the CDFI sector and a lack of 
a clear narrative and profile of the CDFI sector. 
This resulted in high finance costs, limited deal 
flow and a slow process to fundraise. 
• Lack sectoral narrative and leadership: 
The CDFI sector lacked, it was felt by several 
stakeholders, a common voice and way to 
present aggregate data in a coherent way. We 
believe this is corroborated by the significant 
challenges we encountered in collecting 
financial data from the CDFIs. They vary 
considerably in how they measure and report 
data (especially regarding loan delinquency). 
Linked to this, the sector needed a more clearly 
articulated USP and offering, possibly linked to 
its ability to serve those most excluded. There 
was also a sense that the sector needed an 
independent champion, though it was noted 
that Michael Sheen could potentially fill this 
role.
• Capacity to experiment and innovate: There 
was a sense among CDFIs that they lacked 
the resources and capacity to experiment with 
different products, delivery mechanisms and 
business models. There was no room for failure, 
so the organisations could only tweak their 
product and approaches. Yet they sensed that 
customers might benefit from radically different 
products and support.
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4.1. Introduction
Growth in terms of a business model normally 
refers to the number of employees, value of assets 
or level of turnover. In the UK, firms are classed as 
SMEs if they satisfy two of these three criteria.
Employees Turn-
over
Net 
assets
Medium-
sized
< 250 < £25.9m < £12.9m
Small < 50 < £6.5m < £3.26m
 
By this definition, two of the CDFIs are medium 
enterprises, whilst five are small. In this report, we 
define growth as an increase in the value of annual 
lending, given that the emphasis is on meeting a 
market need rather than generating tax revenue 
or contributing to economic growth. As illustrated 
below, we argue that the market conditions help 
determine the business model the CDFIs can 
pursue.
A viable business model in this context ranges 
from merely being cost-effective (relative to 
other interventions) to being able to generate a 
profit. In the middle, providers can reach financial 
operational or financial sustainability (i.e. cover 
operating and financing costs rather than generate 
a return). Market conditions, such as interest rate 
caps, employment structure and the maturity and 
size of the formal financial sector, influence the 
nature and extent of the demand as well as the 
ability of providers to generate income to cover 
costs (see Vik, 2019 for a more in-depth discussion). 
Linked to these, there are three distinct logics to 
scaling up, which we will explore in this chapter:
• Commercial logic: In the microfinance industry 
there has been a drive for institutions to 
become financially self-sustainable, often driven 
by international development agencies. Whilst 
the sector has grown dramatically through 
this logic, tensions have emerged between the 
social mission and raising capital by providing 
commercial returns to the investors.7
7 The most spectacular example of this being the IPO in 2013 of Mexican 
microfinance provider Compartamos, which enriched private investors 
with returns on equity exceeding 50%
4. Scaling up the personal lending 
CDFI sector
Market conditions
• Financial market (maturity mainstream sector etc.)
• Supply restrictions (interest rate restrictions etc.)
• Economic structure (manufacturing, self-employment etc.)
Viable business model
Viability:
Levers: 
Cost-effective
Public
Sustainable 
Operationally Financially
Profitable
Commercial
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• Public policy logic: CDFIs in Europe and, 
to some extent, in the US, have scaled up 
through strong links to public policy objectives 
and debates. For example, Maria Nowak, the 
founder of Adie in France, played a significant 
role in passing regulation more conducive for 
self-employment as well as legislation enabling 
microfinance institutions to lend. This has 
led to a sustained level of public funding and 
strong partnerships with mainstream financial 
institutions.
• Efficiency logic: The rapid growth of 
the Fintech sector brought about by the 
combination of the financial crisis, technological 
breakthroughs and changing consumer habits 
and preferences is likely to change the way in 
which financial services are developed, delivered 
and used. The Fintech sector operates on the 
belief it can scale up rapidly through changing 
expectations and transforming operational 
models.
This chapter seeks to answer three questions, 
based on case study research and financial 
sensitivity analysis:
• Where is the sector currently heading and when 
will they reach £200m?
• What would a £200m personal lending CDFI 
sector look like?
• What levers to scale up are available and how 
effective might they be?
4.2. Current trajectory
Before turning to how the sector and its 
stakeholders can use the three different logics 
to scale up the personal lending CDFI sector, we 
need to examine its current trajectory against the 
ambition of £200m by 2026/27. Chart 4.1 shows 
the current growth trajectory for the participating 
CDFIs based in their annual growth rate for 13/14-
16/17. It falls a long way short, only reaching £50m 
by 2027.
The CDFIs in the sample will just exceed £50m 
in annual lending by the end of the period. This 
despite growing by just over 9% annually. Chart 
4.2 shows when the participating CDFIs will reach 
£200m at this growth rate.
Chart 4.1: Current growth trajectory 16/17-26/27 (£m)
250
200
150
100
50
0
16/17 17/18 18/19 19/20 20/21 21/22 22/23 23/24 24/25 26/27
 Aspiration            Annual lending £m
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At their current rate of growth, the CDFIs would 
only reach the £200m ambition sometime in 
2042/43. Whilst this may be disappointing, it is 
important to put this in context. Chart 4.3 shows 
the steady rate growth trajectory under which the 
CDFIs would reach £200m. It is assumed that the 
CDFIs retain their respective market shares. 
Reaching this level of lending within a ten-year period 
would require the CDFIs to grow at an average 
annual rate of nearly 25%. In other words, we 
would be requiring these CDFIs to be high growth 
firms, or gazelles. OECD defines high growth firms 
as companies with average annualised growth in 
employees or turnover greater than 20% per annum, 
over a three-year period, with a minimum of 10 
employees at the beginning of the growth period 
(see Lee et al, 2016). Yet, Lee et al (2016) conclude 
that less than 10% of UK firms can be classed as 
high growth firms based on this definition. Indeed, 
according to Du and Bonner (2017), between 1998 
and 2013 the proportion of high growth firms in the 
UK never exceeds 2%. Further, it is very difficult to 
sustain such growth over a longer period. Less than 
40% of high growth firms continued to grow after the 
initial high growth period. The remainder stagnated, 
declined or exited the market. Moreover, mergers and 
acquisitions are an important component for growth 
for many high growth firms, with around 20% of high 
growth firms undertake some form of acquisition as 
part of growth (Lee et al, 2016). However, we here 
would expect the CDFIs to rely exclusively on organic 
growth. Finally, we also expect the CDFIs to grow 
exclusively serving the domestic market, whilst high 
growth firms more generally may also grow targeting 
international markets.
Before turning to how this growth could be 
capitalised, we turn to what a sector lending 
£200m would look like. We conduct the financial 
sensitivity analysis only for the five CDFIs with an 
expressed objective to scale up. We forecast the 
income and expenditure for these CDFIs based on 
Chart 4.2: CDFIs reach £200m ambition
Chart 4.3: Annual lending (£ ‘000s)
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the following assumptions: 
 We use the current operating costs as a base 
and assume that these increase at the rate of 
inflation (2%), whilst other financial income, 
operating revenue and financing costs remain 
constant;
 We assume the market share, loan portfolio 
characteristics (e.g. average loan size, term 
and bad debts) and pricing of individual CDFIs 
remains unchanged;
 In line with their business plans, all CDFIs grow 
almost exclusively through remote delivery 
channels (combination of online and telephone);
 All the CDFIs grow at 25.4% per year (the 
annual growth rate required to hit £200m 
within 10-year period);
 Depending on the loan officer productivity 
and the channel, the CDFIs incur the following 
direct costs associated with growth:
– Loan officer salaries (£25,000) + on-costs 
(15.8%: NIC + 2% pension contribution);
– 0.25 admin officer support per loan officer 
(£17,000 + 15.8% in on-costs);
– A branch costs around £45,000 in rent and 
running costs and can host 3 loan officers;
– A telephone loan officer requires around 
£4,900 in office rent and running costs (the 
same assumed for administrator)
– FT middle manager (at £40,000 + on-
costs) needed for every 10 loan officers & 
administrators
– CDFIs incur £2.50 credit check cost per 
application
 We assume that a telephone-based loan officer 
can do double the number of loans as a branch-
based loan officer with the same level of admin 
support (0.25). For online lending, we assume 
that a loan officer can process 1,100, which is 
the average for the three CDFIs that provided 
this data for their online lending.
 As the CDFIs grow, they have to spend more on 
building the executive management team and 
the board, including recruiting more executive 
directors and increasing pay to attract and 
retain talent. Below we have estimated ballpark 
management and board cost at five stages by 
annual lending.
Annual lending: £10m £25m £50m £75m £100m
Number executive 
directors
2 3 5 8 8
Cost per executive director £60,000 £80,000 £100,000 £125,000 £150,000
Total cost executive 
directors
£120,000 £240,000 £500,000 £1,000,000 £1,200,000
Cost chief executive £75,000 £100,000 £125,000 £150,000 £175,000
Number non-executive 
directors
5 6 8 8 8
Director’s fee £5,000 £10,000 £15,000 £20,000 £25,000
Director costs £25,000 £60,000 £120,000 £160,000 £200,000
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 In addition to direct delivery costs and 
increased management and governance costs, 
we assume that the CDFIs will have to increase 
their IT spend and capital expenditure (see 
projections in table below).
 
Projected percentage of gross 
income spent on…
IT & data analytics 3%
Capital expenditure 3%
 Spending on IT and data analytics is another 
important area of expenditure to support 
expansion. It was also an area identified as a 
barrier to expansion in the previous chapter. It is 
difficult to assess the need for IT spend across 
the CDFIs, as they will have different needs 
and vary in terms of past IT investment. It is 
estimated that the private sector on average 
spends just over 3% of gross revenue on IT. We 
assume the CDFIs similarly will need to spend 
around 3% on IT.
 Although not shown in the income statement, 
there is an ongoing need for capital expenditure 
to support expansion (e.g. investing in assets, 
equipment etc.). High cost commercial credit 
providers spend in the region of 3-5% of turnover 
on capital expenditure. We assume that the 
CDFIs will similarly have to invest in the region of 
3% of gross income on such expenditure.
 Given the emphasis on growing through 
telephone and online lending, the CDFIs 
will have to spend a significant amount on 
marketing. It is estimated that the now defunct 
online payday lender Wonga spent 19.2% 
and 17.3% of costs and profit on marketing 
in 2010 and 2011, respectively (Beddows and 
McAteer, 2014). This translates into a cost of 
acquisition per new customer of nearly £67 
(Beddows and McAteer, 2014). In comparison, 
the four CDFIs providing data on marketing, on 
average spent less than 5% of gross income. 
On average, the four CDFIs that provided this 
data has a marketing spend of £6.2 per loan 
originated in branch and £31.8 per loan issued 
remotely (telephone or online). We use this data 
to calculate the marketing spend based on the 
growth per delivery channel.
 Given the level of growth required to reach 
£200m in 10 years, it will not enough for the 
CDFIs to rely on repeat borrowers. Based on 
the current level of repeat borrowing among 
the CDFIs, we estimate the number of loans 
to new borrowers (see table below). This is 
important because loans to new customers are 
significantly smaller and have higher default 
rates. We recognise that there is anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that repeat borrowing 
is lower for remote lending channels than for 
branch. However, we do not have systematic 
data on this to take this into account in the 
financial modelling.
Table 4.1 shows the size and composition of the 
upscaled sector in terms of amount lent, number 
of loans, delivery channels and number of staff 
and branches.
Based on the average amounts lent by the CDFIs 
for new and repeat customers, we estimate that 
the sector would have to issue just over 415,000 
loans annually to reach £200m. To sustain an 
annual growth of 25.4%, the participating CDFIs 
would have to make significant number of loans 
to new customers, especially in the first year. This 
has a material impact on the bottom line, as new 
customers are more likely to default and borrow 
smaller amounts. 
In line with the business plans of the CDFIs, most 
of the growth would come through remote lending 
channels (online and telephone). Remote lending 
will surpass branch-based originations already in 
the second year. By the end of the period, remote 
lending will make up 90% of loans issued. We 
estimate that CDFI staffing levels will increase from 
269 today to 777. In comparison, credit unions in 
England, Wales and Scotland have 1,720 employees 
managing 373,000 loans of a value of £840m. It is 
important to note that some of these members of 
staff work on other activities, as some of the CDFIs 
operate with multiple products and services.
Table 4.2 shows the income and expenditure by 
year. We also include capital expenditure although 
this normally shown in the balance sheet of the 
providers.
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In aggregate terms the participating CDFIs 
only generate positive net income after current 
financing costs when they surpass £40m in 
annual lending. This suggests that, as the CDFIs 
reach a certain scale, per unit costs fall. This well 
documented effect is referred to as economies 
of scale. Whilst the CDFIs cover current and 
direct delivery costs, they are unable to cover the 
additional spend on marketing, IT and governance 
and management, which are all important to scale 
up. They are only able to cover capital expenditure 
after surpassing £50m in annual lending. This 
reflects that the CDFIs, like other high growth 
firms, would require significant upfront investment 
in systems, processes and management to grow. 
We will discuss their ability to cover financing costs 
later when we address the capital required to lend 
at this scale.
In gross terms, there is a cumulative shortfall 
before financing costs of over £3.6m. If we take 
into account the estimated capital expenditure 
required, this would increase to £7.8m. In other 
words, the CDFIs would require significant upfront 
investment and support to get to a stage where 
they can break even and that is before we consider 
the financing costs associated with such an 
expansion.
Below the aggregate picture, there are some 
important drivers of cost and sustainability. First, size 
of loan is an important determinant of the ability 
to cover costs. The two CDFIs generating a surplus 
in year one after current financing costs, provide 
considerably larger loans. One of them also has 
significant other financial income and operating 
income, without which it would be running a deficit in 
the first two years. At the other end, one of the CDFIs 
offer very small loans and only generates a surplus 
after financing costs on surpassing £15m in lending. 
Second, a low cost-base and cost per loan positively 
affect sustainability. One provider is very close to 
covering its costs in year 1 despite offering small 
loans because of its low cost-base. A further provider 
has a high cost-base and small scale, making it more 
difficult to cover costs.
The capital requirements to reach and sustain 
£200m in lending in a ten-year timeframe would 
be substantial. Chart 4.4 estimates the annual 
needs for capital to sustain a ten-year steady 
growth trajectory to £200m. We assume that the 
CDFIs retain their respective shares of the market 
and that everything else remains unchanged 
(e.g. interest rates etc.) There are three lines in the 
chart: the gross capital need in green (assuming 
CDFIs have no capital); taking into account cash in 
hand (orange); and factoring in cash in hand and 
outstanding balances of long-term funds (blue). 
Chart 4.4: Capital required for £200m lending (£’000s)
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The capital needs after recycling are considerable. 
The gross need for capital starts at around £6.4m 
in year 1 and increases significantly to over £45m 
by year 10. The gross need for capital is over the 
period is nearly £205m. The current levels of cash 
in hand and long-term loans would only fully cover 
the first two years of growth and 20% and 10% of 
the capital for the third and fourth year. Thereafter, 
the CDFIs would have to make up the shortfall 
through net income, grant funding, loans or equity-
like investment.
Chart 4.5 shows the capital required after using 
cash in hand, long-term funds and net income 
against the capital need after using cash in hand 
and long-term funds.
In aggregate terms the CDFIs only start 
generating net income in year 3 so the capital 
need would remain at £1.5m in year 2. Further, 
we assume the CDFIs could cover the first year of 
capital through existing funds and loans. The chart 
indicates that the CDFIs would be able to cover 
around less than half of their capital needs through 
their net income. The remaining gap in funding 
would still be significant at nearly £120m.
As net income, existing cash in hand and long-term 
funding commitments are not sufficient to cover 
the need for capital, it is natural that at least some 
of this shortfall will be bridged by borrowed capital. 
Chart 4.6 shows the financial sustainability of the 
participating CDFIs if they had to borrow capital to 
fill the need for capital at 2%, 6% and 10%. (There 
are CDFIs in the sample that pay all these rates for 
some or all their finance). 
The level of interest rates charged by social 
investors and other organisations lending to 
the CDFIs significantly affects the financial 
sustainability at the sector. By the end of the 
period, the level of financial sustainability is nearly 
Chart 4.5: Capital need after income (£’000s)
Chart 4.6: Financial sustainability at different financing costs
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10% lower if the CDFIs pay 10% rather than 
2%, and 5% if they pay 10% rather than 6%. 
To put this in context, the CDFIs would have to 
pay an extra £1.5m in the first four years at 10% 
compared with 6% and over £8m over the 10-
year period. This additional financing costs would 
reduce what the sector could invest in improving 
services or reducing costs for the end-user. In short, 
they need cheap and patient capital. 
4.3. Levers for growth
We now turn to the possible levers for growth. We 
estimate the impact of these levers in terms of 
capital required (plugging capital gap or otherwise 
reducing capital need) and sustainability (i.e. 
increasing net income).
4.4. Commercial levers
Overall the expectation is for CDFIs to cover their 
operating and financing costs through income 
generated from interest and fee income paid by 
their customers. In other words, they should be 
financially sustainable and not rely on grants and 
subsidies. This expectation stems in part but not 
wholly from the international microfinance sector 
where there is a broad consensus since the early 
2000s that MFIs should be financially sustainable. 
The work of Carnegie, the End High Cost Credit 
Alliance and Fair4All all supports operationally 
sustainable lenders. International microfinance, 
then, provides some important lessons in using a 
commercial logic to scale up:
 Importance initial support: Even in 
international microfinance, as few as 20-25% 
MFIs report not using subsidies in some form 
(D’Espallier et al, 2013). Instead, there is an 
ongoing transition from subsidy dependence 
to financial sustainability. International aid 
agencies continue to play an important role, 
including in loan guarantees and technical 
assistance. Compartamos, an MFI in Mexico, 
that has reached full sustainability received 
significant initial support, around US$6m, in 
technical assistance, grants and subordinated 
debt from aid agencies to support it to scale up 
(see Appendix C for case studies).
 Efficient business model: International 
experience suggests that financially sustainable 
MFIs have an efficient underlying business 
model, based on an efficient operating model 
(keeping costs low) and commercial pricing 
policy (pricing for risk and costs). Compartamos 
had lower costs and charged comparatively 
higher rates than other MFIs in the region.
  Institutional transformation: As MFIs 
outgrow their current funding arrangements, 
many seek to undertake institutional 
transformation to access capital markets and 
deposits. Compartamos converted into a for-
profit to access capital markets (e.g. shares, 
equity) and then into a bank to raise capital 
through deposits. Institutional transformation 
has raised concerns about mission drift, as 
some MFIs have been seen to be generating 
profits and dividend payments on the back of 
the exploitation of customers through excessive 
pricing.
Some of these levers are not relevant to CDFIs, 
at least not at the current stage. Institutional 
transformation, for example, would either contravene 
the importance of the not-for-profit status (by 
becoming listed or for-profit) or be unsuitable at this 
current stage (i.e. transforming into deposit-taking 
institution or bank). Instead, we consider three 
other commercial levers: consolidation, improved 
productivity and increased pricing.
4.4.1. Consolidation
Mergers and acquisitions are an important part 
of growth in many sectors. To model this lever, 
we assume that the personal lending activity is 
concentrated in the two most sustainable and 
efficient CDFIs. One CDFI takes on all the branch-
based lending, whilst the other takes on all the 
remote lending. We assume that CDFIs only take 
on the portfolio, the loan officers and the branches 
(i.e. none of the managers). Such an acquisition 
would not affect the total volume of lending in the 
sector but could affect the level of sustainability 
and efficiency. 
Chart 4.7 shows the impact of such a consolidation 
on the ability of the sector to cover operating costs 
(operational sustainability) and financing costs at 
6% (financial sustainability).
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A consolidated sector significantly outperforms 
the current sector. After displaying similar levels 
of sustainability in the first year, a consolidated 
sector would reach financial sustainability already 
in the second year, compared with year 4 for the 
current sector. In absolute terms, a consolidated 
sector would generate a surplus of £2m in its first 
three years compared with a loss of nearly £4m 
for the current sector. A consolidated sector would 
have significantly lower costs due to economies 
of scale in back office, middle management and 
head office costs. In addition, there would be an 
immediate effect of consolidation on productivity 
in the short term, as CDFIs with higher productivity 
take over the portfolio of CDFIs with lower levels of 
productivity.
Over time, the current sector would catch up 
with a consolidated sector, nearly matching 
its sustainability level by year 10. This is due 
to higher income resulting from some of the 
CDFIs subsumed charging higher rates than the 
CDFIs taking over. Furthermore, the consolidated 
CDFIs would face greater management and 
governance costs as they would grow considerably 
in size (surpassing £50m and £140m in lending 
respectively). In addition, there would be sunk costs 
associated with such a take-over, which we have 
not included here.
Chart 4.8 compares the need for capital after net 
income, cash in hand and outstanding long-term 
funds for the baseline and a consolidated sector.
In the short to medium term, consolidation would 
significantly lower the capital requirements, 
required to build scale. In the first eight years, 
a consolidated sector would require £16m less 
in capital than the current sector, owing to a 
greater net income compared with the current 
sector for the first eight years. In the last two 
years, the consolidated sector has greater 
Chart 4.8: Impact of consolidation on capital need (£’000s)
Chart 4.7: Impact of consolidation on sustainability
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capital requirements because of a comparatively 
lower net income, which in turn is due to higher 
management and governance costs and lower 
interest rate income. However, cumulatively, 
the need for capital is nearly £15m less for the 
consolidated sector over the 10-year period.
4.4.2. Improving loan office productivity
Improved productivity is intimately linked 
to growth, because it translates into greater 
efficiency, which, in turn, improves competitiveness. 
We define productivity in a narrow sense as the 
number of loans disbursed per loan officer. We 
estimate the impact of 10 and 25% increases 
in loan officer productivity on the sustainability 
of the sector separately for remote (online and 
telephone) and branch-based delivery. 
Chart 4.9 shows the impact of improved 
productivity on sustainability. The chart 
compares operational sustainability and 
financial sustainability for current and improved 
productivity.
Improving productivity by 10 and 25% improves 
the level of operational and financial sustainability 
over time. Over time, increasing loan officer 
productivity by 10 and 25% increases financial 
sustainability by over 5%. If the CDFIs increased 
the loan officer productivity by these rates, they 
would increase the surplus generated over the 
10-year period by over £8m and £17m respectively. 
This is largely due to lower direct delivery costs 
and associated supervisor and administrator costs. 
Clearly it is not realistic for all the CDFIs to reach 
a higher loan officer productivity rate from year 
one. It would require additional investment in 
systems and processes for some of the CDFIs and 
may also be linked to the scale of the providers. 
Further, it assumes that CDFIs take on same level 
of breakdown of manual intervention, auto-decline 
Chart 4.9: Impact of increased productivity on financial sustainability (%)
Chart 4.10: Impact of increased productivity on capital requirements (£’000s)
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and auto-approval. Nevertheless, even small 
improvements in productivity generate significant 
effects on the bottom line. If the CDFIs were able 
to increase productivity by 1% year on year, they 
would have achieved a 5% uplift in their level of 
financial sustainability by year 10.
Chart 4.10 compares the required capital after 
cash in hand and income for increased productivity 
and baseline.
Because of the significant improvements in 
the financial sustainability ratio the capital 
requirements are also considerably lower. 
Cumulatively the need for capital is between 
£9m (10% increase) and £17m (25% increase) 
lower over the 10-year period compared with 
the baseline scenario. This is because higher 
productivity lowers costs and increases net 
revenue.
4.4.3. Pricing
Pricing is one of the most important and 
controversial elements of using a commercial logic 
to scaling up. Here we estimate the increases in 
interest rates required to be financially sustainable 
from year 1. 
Current Financial 
sustainability
Average 
APR*
175.5% 203.93%
*Average for five CDFIs in financial forecasting only;
There is a £1.7m shortfall in interest and fee 
income to cover the operating and current 
financing costs. This would involve an increase of 
around 16% in interest income. If all the CDFIs 
increased their current APR by this, it would lead to 
an APR of 203.93%, which is still significantly below 
the rates charged by commercial high cost credit 
providers. As an example, this would mean a £500 
loan over 52 weeks would cost £367 in interest. 
This is slightly misleading in that some CDFIs 
might have grants to cover some non-lending 
activities included in the financial data.
4.5. Public policy levers
In Western Europe and the US, MFIs have scaled 
up through fulfilling public policy objectives 
around inclusion and self-employment. MFIs in 
these countries are addressing a market failure, 
as markets do not operate efficiently, preventing 
people with viable business propositions to access 
finance or due to positive or negative societal 
externalities (e.g. welfare costs etc.). The market as 
it stands does not serve certain groups or generate 
certain outcomes. The MFIs are often perceived 
as being a more cost-effective way of achieving 
these goals relative to other interventions rather 
than being fully financially sustainable. In Europe 
it is linked to a market failure, as lending to certain 
segments and purposes is not commercially viable 
because of interest rate restrictions. 
There are four main lessons from the use of public 
policy levers to scale up from the US, UK and 
Europe (case studies can be found in Appendix C):
 Not only government: There tends to be 
multiple private and public sector interests 
involved in supporting MFIs to achieve public 
policy goals. The government often provides 
limited direct investment and instead focuses 
on compelling mainstream financial institutions 
to support MFIs. In the USA, banks can fulfil 
their regulatory requirements under Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) through partnering 
with and supporting the CDFI sector.
 Common understanding of roles: A form of 
social compact or common understanding of 
roles and objectives governs the actions and roles 
of the different parties. There is a clearly defined 
target group and a set of outcome goals. In the 
case of Adie in France, there is a social compact 
between government, Adie and the banks. Adie 
lends to groups unable to access mainstream 
finance in a cost-effective, but not financially 
sustainable, manner. Therefore, government 
provides a supportive regulatory framework and 
guarantees, whilst banks provide revolving credit 
and grants. Once they have built up a positive 
credit history, Adie moves the customers on to 
partner banks. Qredits in the Netherlands works 
closely with the largest banks in setting the upper 
limit for its SME loans (below which banks cannot 
operate) and there is a referral partnership.
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 Multiple forms of support: The public 
policy logic is most effective when involving 
multiple forms of support, including risk sharing 
mechanisms, grants, technical assistance, 
staff secondment, referrals, office sharing 
and revolving credit. The experience of CITR 
suggests one tool (i.e. tax credit) is insufficient 
in itself. In the US, the CDFI Fund offers 
multiple forms of support, including bonds, 
guarantees, technical assistance and loans. 
PerMicro in Italy can operate out of bank 
branches and access revolving credit facilities 
from banks. 
 Identified providers: The MFIs involved in 
fulfilling public policy objectives are clearly 
identified. In some cases, such as with the 
US CDFI Fund and CITR, MFIs have to be 
certified or accredited to access support. In 
Italy, France and Netherlands, there is a single 
national microfinance provider. Common for 
the providers is that they are often not-for-profit 
and subject to some form of asset lock.
In this section, we discuss the potential 
effectiveness of four potential public policy levers: 
tax incentive, guarantee fund, government equity/
patient capital and grants covering head office 
costs.
4.5.1. Community Investment Tax Relief
There is a tax relief for organisations and 
individuals investing in UK business lending CDFIs 
called Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR). 
Investors receive income or corporate tax relief 
worth 25% of the money invested in accredited 
CDFIs and spread over five years. Retail CDFIs (i.e. 
those lending directly to small businesses) can raise 
up to £10m and wholesale CDFIs can raise £20 
under the scheme. The CDFIs have to onward lend 
the funds to SMEs in disadvantaged communities.
We model the extension of CITR to personal 
lending CDFIs. It would have the following features 
• Enable retail CDFIs to raise £10m and 
wholesale CDFIs to raise £20m under the 
scheme;
• Provide investors with income or corporate tax 
relief worth 25% of investment and spread over 
five years;
Extending the CITR could potentially have two 
impacts on the CDFIs. First, it could attract 
additional investment to the sector from new 
and existing investors. Second, it could reduce the 
financing costs for the CDFIs as existing corporate 
investors would use the tax relief to reduce the 
interest charged to CDFIs.8
Low High
Investment 
under CITR
£5m £10m
It is estimated that around £5-10m could be 
raised under CITR annually based on the historical 
experience of the business lending CDFI sector. A 
proportion of this would likely be existing investors 
starting to lend to or invest under CITR. It is 
difficult to estimate that additionality of the CITR, 
but we believe it would be relatively modest. Due 
to state aid rules, the tax relief and total interest 
rates cannot exceed what the investor would have 
charged if a commercial rate had been applied. 
Investors we have spoken with also suggest that 
the scheme would be more effective once the 
sector achieves greater scale. However, it is possible 
that combined with other interventions and the 
current interest in the sector, that the scheme 
would generate greater investment into the sector. 
As illustrated earlier, the interest rate charged 
significantly influences sustainability. If investors 
were to reduce the rate charged by 5% this could 
make a difference of hundreds of thousands in 
financing costs from year one to millions in year 
10. Additionally, the set-up costs for individual 
CDFIs would likely be modest – around £3,0009 – 
unless the CDFIs are seeking to attract significant 
investment from retail investors, which may involve 
considerable additional costs to cover legal work, 
regulatory compliance and prospectus (possibly in 
the tens of thousands). 
8 In practice (for corporate investors) there is no State Aid where the total 
interest charged on the loan and yearly tax relief is equal to or less than 
what would have been charged if a deemed commercial rate had been 
charged. This essentially means that corporate investors are getting the 
same return that they would have if they had lent to the accredited body 
at a commercial rate. As such, the benefit is passed on to the CDFI in the 
form of cheaper capital.
9 This is what a consultancy company charges for conducting the 
accreditation process on behalf of a CDFI.
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4.5.2. Guarantee fund
Guarantees are an important tool for increasing 
the supply of credit to underserved markets 
and for improving the financial sustainability 
of financial intermediaries. There are various 
forms of guarantees, which may be provided by 
governments, international donors, foundations 
and other organisations. Some, such as the UK 
Enterprise Finance Guarantee, guarantees up to a 
given proportion of outstanding facility balance to 
end-users (normally small businesses) to encourage 
greater lending by reducing the risk for the lender. 
Under the EaSI programme, EIF guarantees up to 
a maximum of 80% for each loan defaulting up 
to a cap rate of maximum of 30% for microcredit 
provided by banks and MFIs. Other guarantees 
are used to guarantee loans from or investment by 
banks or other investments to MFIs. This is typical 
for the guarantee schemes set up by international 
donors to enable MFIs to access more and 
different forms of finance.
Here we assume that the guarantee fund would 
provide a guarantee for loans to and investment 
in personal lending CDFIs for 10-50% of realised 
loss of principal. The fund could have the following 
features:
 Guarantee loans to CDFIs fulfilling minimum 
criteria for financial and institutional viability 
and robustness of underwriting and loan 
delinquency procedures;
 Cover up to £20m of outstanding balance of 
lending/investment for each investor;
 Cover loans and investments by investors that 
are new to sector or substantially different or 
increased lending or investment by existing 
investors (to increase additionality); 
Guarantee funds may improve the capacity of the 
sector to scale up in two ways. First, it may enable 
the CDFIs to access finance at better terms (e.g. 
lower rate, different structure). Second, it may 
increase additional funding that they otherwise 
would not be able to access. In either case it 
involves a role for Government. 
We have examined various guarantee schemes. 
Leverage effects vary considerably across 
different schemes. In the US, guarantees for 
CDFIs for real estate lending leverage effects 
are as high as 26-30. Most of the US CDFI Fund 
programmes leverage at least US$8 per dollar 
invested. Guarantees aimed at more marginal, 
often rural markets have lower leverage, such 
as the GRAD Loan Guarantee Fund in Ethiopia, 
which has a leverage of 2.5. The EU microfinance 
EaSI guarantee has a leverage of 3.6 for its 
microfinance activity. 
It is difficult to assess where on this scale a guarantee 
fund for personal lending CDFIs would be on this 
scale. We judge such a fund to be unlikely to leverage 
funding equivalent to the US CDFI sector, as this 
sector is heavily engaged in real estate lending, has 
a larger philanthropic investment sector and benefits 
from greater and more sustained government 
support. We assume that the fund would cover 
around £20m of investment at any time and would 
have a leverage of between 2.5 and 3.6.
Low High
Size of guarantee 
fund
£20m £20m
Multiplier 2.5* 3.6**
Additional 
investment
£50m £72m
 *Average for GRAD Fund Ethiopia; 
**Average leverage of EaSI Guarantee;
The resulting £50m to £72m would make a 
significant contribution in filling the net £120m 
capital gap over the period.
4.5.3. Government providing patient capital
National governments, international aid agencies 
and foundations have played an important role 
by providing long-term, low cost patient capital 
to enable MFIs to scale up and access capital. 
We model that government provides £20m in 
quasi equity to the sector structured as long-term 
subordinate debt at a low return (see table on 
following page).
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Access to such long-term, patient capital would 
improve the financial sustainability of the CDFIs 
and contribute to the capitalising of the sector. 
It would also enable CDFIs to hire staff or make 
capital investment without having to cover the 
costs immediately (see table below).
Impact of patient capital on bottom line
Patient capital £20m
Cumulative deficit Y1-3 -£3.6m
After capital expenditure Y1-3 -£7.8m
Net patient capital £8.6m
In aggregate terms, the patient capital would enable 
the sector to cover its cumulative deficit for the first 
two years, though one of the CDFIs accumulate a 
deficit exceeding its allocation of patient capital. As 
such it would remove an important stumbling block 
for scaling up. The remaining funds would account for 
around 7% of the need for capital. More strategically 
important than this, the patient capital would enable 
the sector to attract additional investment. 
4.5.4. Funding head office costs
In some European countries, such as France 
and Belgium, MFIs may not be able to be fully 
sustainable because of restrictions on interest 
rates. Adie in France has its head office and central 
costs funded through grants, whilst the interest 
income covers the direct delivery and capital 
costs associated with the lending. We investigate 
the implications of having the public, private or 
charitable sector covering the head office costs of 
the participating CDFIs. We include the following 
items in head office and central costs:
• Audit, legal and professional fees;
• Head office rent and costs;
• Bank and other charges;
• Printing and stationary;
• Executive directors;
• Middle management;
We have excluded the remuneration of non-
executive directors as we consider it unlikely for 
Government or foundations to cover such a cost. 
Chart 4.11 compares the head office costs and the 
current net income (after current financing costs).
Y1-3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10-15
0% 2% 2.5% 3% 3.5% 4% 4.5% 5%
£0 £0.4m £0.5m £0.6m £0.7m £0.8m £0.9m £1m
Chart 4.11: Impact of head office cover on bottom line
£32,000,000
£27,000,000
£22,000,000
£17,000,000
£12,000,000 
£7,000,000
£2,000,000
-£3,000,000
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
 Head office costs       Net income after current financing costs        Break even
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Covering the head office costs would make an 
important contribution to the bottom line of the 
participating CDFIs in the first 2-3 years. It would 
cover nearly 80% of the deficit in year 1 and all the 
deficit in year 2. Over time there is less of a need 
for covering head office costs as the sector makes 
a surplus after financing costs. We would argue 
there would be two contextual factors that make 
up the rationale for covering head office costs for 
CDFIs. First, there is a stronger social orientation 
in terms of depth of outreach, social outcomes 
or other obvious impediments to commercial 
viability (e.g. interest rate cap, need for investment-
readiness support for customers etc.). Second, 
related to this, there may be considerable goodwill 
and in-kind support from private and public sector 
(e.g. free premises, secondment of staff, board 
members etc.). There is no obvious impediment 
to a commercial orientation in personal lending 
CDFIs, as the market is not price sensitive and 
customers do not require (and generally do not 
want) extensive support to take out a loan.
4.6. Technological levers
The rapid growth of the Fintech sector brought 
about by the combination of the financial crisis, 
technological breakthroughs and changing 
consumer habits and preferences is likely to 
change the way in which financial services are 
developed, delivered and used. The Fintech sector 
operates on the belief it can scale up rapidly 
through changing expectations and transforming 
operational models. We have and are already 
seeing some examples of the disruption they can 
bring about. For example, Wonga revolutionised 
the high cost credit market and the expectations 
of its customers through providing instant online 
access to small loans. This was enabled by an 
automated lending process and enhanced 
data pool and made viable through pricing and 
high rejection rates. There are also examples of 
potential disruption in the affordable credit sector. 
Fintech companies, such as Salary Finance, provide 
payroll deduction lending to employees of large 
companies, traditionally the preserve of the credit 
union movement.
There are three developments that epitomise and 
embody this Fintech revolution (see case studies in 
Appendix C):
• Blockchain: Widely hailed as among the 
greatest recent technological innovations, 
blockchain uses a peer-to-peer network which 
rids financial transactions of a third party, such 
as banks, for mediation (Ikeda and Hamid, 
2018). In a blockchain, blocks are ordered block 
by block with each block referencing to the 
previous one and its fingerprint, and new ones 
are created by using algorithms, which ensures 
the consistency and validity. As well as a block’s 
fingerprint, each block contains content relating 
to transactions or data, as well as the technical 
data concerning the block. Because anybody 
can check any proposed transaction against the 
blockchain, this approach removes the need for 
a central authority and thus for participants to 
have confidence in the integrity of any single 
entity. Blockchain offers a range of benefits 
to organisations because they are: distributed 
widely in a precisely controlled fashion; highly 
efficient; robust in rejecting unauthorised 
changes; characterised by high level of privacy 
and confidentiality; secure for data; enabling 
significant reduction of operational costs; and 
highly transparent. However, the technology is 
still in its infancy and there are few examples of 
its implementation.
• Big data: Defined as “datasets that are too 
large for traditional data-processing systems 
and that therefore require new technologies” 
(Provost and Fawcett, 2013, quoted in Power, 
2014), Big Data is widely used by financial 
institutions, including detecting fraud, credit 
underwriting, delinquency control, marketing 
and customer behavioural insights. Due to data 
sets growing rapidly in part because they are 
increasingly gathered by cheap and numerous 
information-sensing mobile devices such as 
software logs, cameras, microphones and 
mobile phones, Big Data offers large amounts 
of information that can be beneficial for 
organisations. Accuracy in Big Data may lead 
to more confident decision making, and better 
decisions can result in greater operational 
efficiency, cost reduction and reduced risk. The 
use of Big Data is already widespread among 
larger financial service providers.
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• Artificial intelligence: Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) can broadly be summed up as technologies 
that have adaptive and predictive power 
capable of autonomous learning. This enables it 
to recognise patterns, anticipate future events, 
make decisions and communicate with other 
people (Deloitte, 2018). In financial services, 
AI is being used in several areas, including 
customer interaction (e.g. chat bots), regulatory 
compliance and investment (e.g. asset 
management). Although AI has a long way to 
go in terms of its sophistication, examples of its 
use in finance are already beginning to emerge.
There is unquestionably a lot of hype around the 
Fintech sector. After all, financial institutions have 
engaged in technological innovation since WWII 
and before. But there are three key developments 
that underpin this latest wave of innovation:
• High speed internet connections, allowing for 
cloud computing and online platforms;
• Exponential increases in computing, unlocking 
algorithms and data sources;
• Widespread adoption of smartphones, 
providing a new channel for 24/7 services via 
apps.
In this section, we will be focusing on the cost-
effectiveness of online lending.
4.6.1.Online lending
The personal lending CDFI sector has sought to 
introduce online lending in addition to or instead of 
its branch-based offering. This has largely been an 
attempt to reduce and control costs, scale up and stay 
relevant in response to changing consumer behaviour 
and preferences. As discussed in Section 3.2, five out of 
the seven CDFIs in the sample have introduced some 
form of online lending in the last 4-5 years or so. 
Discussions around online lending often conflate 
delivery channel (online, branch, telephone) and 
underwriting methodology (automated, manual). 
Yet, any combination of underwriting and delivery 
channels is possible. Indeed, none of the providers 
have a fully automated online decision engine but 
operate with varying degrees of manual intervention. 
All the CDFIs engaging in online lending were seeking 
to automate decision-making as far as possible. 
Yet the CDFIs still intervene manually in 50-80% 
of online applications. Conversely, providers that 
had not moved into online lending had introduced 
online preapplication screening and collecting data 
remotely ahead of branch-based loan interviews. 
For the purposes of this discussion, we focus 
exclusively on automated lending done online. This 
model is also believed to offer the greatest cost 
savings, not requiring loan officers or high street 
branches. Table 4.3 compares the cost and portfolio 
structure for online and branch lending.
Table 4.3: Cost and portfolio characteristics by channel1
Online Branch
Portfolio characteristics
Mean loan amount2
Bad debt provisioning
Repeat lending
Conversion rate
£445
19.4%
10%
8%
£632
15.1%
70%
60%
Running costs
Branch running costs3
Loan officers per branch3
Loan officer productivity
Customer acquisition cost
-
-
-
£31.7
£45,000
3
365
£6.2
1 Estimated using management information and management testimonies from 5 CDFIs; 
2 Estimated using data on mean loan amount for repeat and new customers; 
3 Estimated based on management information from two CDFIs
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Online and branch-based lending differ 
significantly. The level of repeat borrowing is 
much lower for online compared with branch 
lending – 10 compared with around 70%. This has 
important implications because repeat customers 
are lower risk, borrow larger amounts and have a 
higher conversion rate. Moreover, a low conversion 
rate means that online lenders have to attract 
and screen a larger number of applications 
than branches, which increases costs. Customer 
acquisition costs are also five times greater online 
relative to branch. Whereas a high street presence 
increases visibility, providers have to spend 
considerable on marketing to establish a digital 
presence. Online loans also appear to be greater 
risk. Management interviews suggest that online 
customers have higher levels of debt, which can 
be hard to accurately determine in a fast-moving 
market, and it can be more difficult to collect 
debt due to greater geographical spread and a 
reluctance among online customers to interact via 
telephone or F2F. 
For branch-based lenders face significant 
costs linked to opening and running a branch. 
Management information and interviews suggest 
that annual branch running costs are in the region 
of £45,000, whilst it costs around £20,000 in 
set-up costs. According to one manager, it takes 
around three years for a branch to break even. 
Typically, a branch has around three loan officers 
who can underwrite around 365 loans a year each.
The table on p.56 compares a fully branch versus 
fully online CDFI sector originating £200m in 
lending annually. We use the respective portfolio 
and cost indicators from the above table. For the 
remainder we use the same assumptions as with 
the rest of the modelling (see Section 4.2). For the 
sake of simplicity, we have not included head office 
costs. 
As expected, the cost structure of branch and 
online differ significantly. The costs are significantly 
lower (nearly £10m lower) for online compared 
with branch. Loan officer salaries and branch 
running costs make up the bulk of the costs for 
branch-based lenders. Their acquisition and credit 
reference fees are likely to much lower relative to 
online lenders. Given the higher bad debt ratio 
for online lending, net fee and interest income is 
greater for branch-based lenders. 
It should be noted that automated lending is 
currently not a realistic prospect for the CDFI 
sector. As mentioned above, most applications – as 
many as 80% - still require manual underwriting.
Apart from cost and portfolio structure, there 
is evidence from the high cost credit market to 
suggest that online customers differ from F2F 
delivery. Evidence from FCA and others suggest 
that online borrowers are more likely to be younger, 
male and employment compared with more 
traditional F2F high cost credit, such as home 
credit and rent-to-own.
Table 4.4 displays customer characteristics for 
2016/17 by delivery channel for three CDFIs, 
the only participating ones to record customer 
characteristics by delivery channel
It is difficult to compare the data. The CDFIs do 
not necessarily record data by delivery channel 
and use different definitions, especially for age 
and income, and different methods of collecting 
such data. Two of the CDFIs used management 
information on customers, whilst one drew on 
customer survey data. The data suggests that 
online customers are more likely to be homeowners 
(8% compared with 3%) and less likely to be 
unemployed (42% online vs. 55-59%) for F2F 
channels. Online customers are possibly also 
younger, though it is difficult to tell given the use of 
different age categories.
In the interviews, three of the CDFIs involved 
in online lending reported that the customer 
characteristics had changed after introducing 
online lending. The traditional customer base 
for personal lending CDFIs consisted of single 
mothers and men on welfare benefits. Reportedly, 
online customers were younger, more single men, 
more people in employment and in private rented 
accommodation. 
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£ ‘000s Online Branch
Amount lent £200m £200m
Number of loans 449,438 316,456
Number loan officers 867
Number administrators 308 217
Number middle managers 26 90
Number branches 289
Customer acquisition costs
Cost per loan £31.7 £6.2
Total cost £14,247 £1,962
Underwriting costs
Conversion rate (%) 8% 60%
Applications needed 7,490,637 527,426
Credit reference fees £2.5 £2.5
Credit reference costs total £18,727 £1,319
Running costs
Branch running costs £0 £13,005,029
Office running costs £1,626 £1,497
Staff salaries
Loan officers £0 £25,100
Administrators £6,060 £4,267
Middle managers £1,188 £4,183
Total running costs £8,874 £48,052
Total costs £41,848 £51,333
Portfolio performance
Net fee & interest income £94,865 £99,926
Bad debt provisioning (%) 19.4% 15.1%
Net income* £53,018 £48,594
*Before overhead and finance costs
From £20m to £200m in lending by 2027     57         
Table 4.4: Customer characteristics by delivery channel
Online A F2F A F2F B
Female 71% Female 73% 71%
Age
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70+
25%
36%
18%
12%
6%
3%
Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
12%
38%
23%
16%
7%
5%
11%
39%
23%
15%
8%
4%
1%
Housing tenure
Owner occupied
Social rented
Private rented
With family/friends
Other
8%
52%
30%
9%
1%
3%
65%
23%
8%
1%
3%
57%
28%
11%
0%
Marital status
Married
Single parent
Living with partner
Couple with children
Single
Other
11%
33%
9%
10%
22%
15%
11%
44%
14%
17%
74%
2%
39%
19%
9%
33%
Children in household 59% 61% 60%
Household income
£0-£6,000
£6,000-£12,000
£12,000-£18,000
£18,000-£24,000
£24,000+
9%
23%
38%
19%
12%
Less than £5k
5-10k
10-15k
15-20k
20-25k
25-30k
30k+
24%
34%
23%
11%
5%
3%
3%
18%
31%
25%
14%
6%
4%
Employment status
Unemployed
Employed
Self-employed
Student
Other
42%
39%
1%
1%
17%
55%
40%
0%
1%
5%
59%
37%
1%
0%
4%
In receipt benefits 55% 85%
Reasons for loan
Home improvement
Household goods
Debt consolidation
Special occasions
Holiday
Vehicle repair/purchase
Other
24%
15%
2%
31%
8%
6%
13%
24%
18%
7%
20%
13%
23%
3%
N/sample size 4,991 7,752 886
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They also often had better access to credit and 
higher levels of debt:
“Sure, so our typical branch 
customer, 70 per cent of our 
customers are female, single, 
children, social housing, a typically 
vulnerable type customer where they 
need a lot of financial handholding 
for want of a better word. Online 
it’s working, it’s about a 60/40 split 
to male, you wouldn’t necessarily 
identify them as financially illiterate, 
it’s more about easy cash, however 
they do have large amount of it, of 
debt, so the indebtedness is much, 
much higher. I think it’s a different 
type of vulnerability, because of 
the access to easy credit, so I think 
you’ve got different risks, and 
different problems with both types 
of demographic in terms of what can 
we do to help them.”
CDFI manager
Apart from potential differences in preference for 
a particular delivery channel, online underwriting 
requires applicants to have a digital credit history 
or track record in some form. Otherwise there is 
nothing to underwrite or analyse. It is common for 
financially excluded households to budget, pay bills 
and do their shopping in cash (see e.g. Vik et al, 
2018). Indeed, one of the original target groups for 
this sector was customers of high cost, commercial 
doorstep lenders or home credit companies, who 
repaid loans in cash to agents visiting their home. 
One CDFI found that it could not award loans it 
would have approved through a F2F interview for 
this reason.
“Regular branch clients noticed 
that we had an online offering and 
started going online. However, 
whilst we would have been able to 
serve them in the branch, they were 
getting rejected online. They did not 
go back to the branch.”
CDFI manager
To address this, the decision engines of four of the 
CDFIs referred declined applicants to telephone 
or branch-based underwriters to collect further 
information, analysis and decision-making. This 
would suggest that manual intervention might 
increase the depth of outreach of online lending.
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This project analysed the social and financial 
achievements of the UK personal lending sector 
and discussed the levers and potential for the 
sector to significantly scale up to provide £200m in 
annual lending in a ten-year timeframe. We make 
the following observations based on this analysis 
and discussion:
 CDFIs reach those most in need:  
Customer data underlines the role of CDFIs as 
ubiquitous vehicles for reaching most excluded. 
Despite transitioning to online and remote 
lending channels, which tends to attract a 
younger, more male, better-off customers in 
employment, half or more of the CDFI customers 
are unemployed, in social housing, women, lone 
parents and on low incomes. The CDFIs provide 
small amounts, typically £350 to 400 to new 
customers, generating significant cost savings 
and encouraging many of them to save. Most 
of the customers self-report improvements in 
wellbeing as a result of the service.
 Improvements in sustainability: 
We observed improvements in terms of 
sustainability. The CDFIs significantly reduced 
their deficits, generally by growing the interest 
income at a greater rate than the costs. There 
were substantial improvements in levels of 
operational and financial sustainability. Most 
of the CDFIs improved productivity through 
rationalising the lending process, including 
telephone lending and making efficiencies in 
the customer journey. The median cost per loan 
fell by 7%. We also observed improvements 
on related measures on efficiency and 
sustainability.
 Clear potential for growth but £200 
million in 10 years unrealistic: 
Despite improvements in efficiency and 
sustainability, we see it as unrealistic to expect 
the sector to grow to £200m in a 10-year 
timeframe. This would require an annual growth 
rate of over 25% (see chart below). 
Such growth is rarely achieved even by 
companies operating in conventional, 
well-functioning markets. To put this into 
perspective, only 1-2% of UK companies can 
be classed as high growth – achieving 20% 
growth annually for 3 years of more. We would 
be expecting the CDFIs to exceed this growth 
without relying on international markets and 
M&As, important sources of growth.
5. Conclusion and 
recommendations
Growth annual lending to reach £200m (£ ‘000s)
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 Need for significant upfront 
investment: Achieving a step-change 
in growth will require significant upfront 
investment in systems and management 
teams. Following a 25% annual growth 
trajectory, the sector would need over 
£3.5m to cover operating costs and nearly 
£8m to cover capital investments in the first 
three years before generating a surplus. 
The CDFIs are not unique in requiring such 
investment to scale up. Indeed, we have not 
come across a single example of scaling up 
of a microfinance institution that have not 
involved such investment. Even in international 
microfinance, large commercial players, such 
as Compartamos in Mexico, benefitted from 
substantial investment and grant funding from 
international development agencies in the 
start-up phase.
 Need for new, patient investment 
models: The current capital and funding 
models are inadequate and insufficient to 
support scaling up of the sector. The gross 
cumulative capital requirement to scale up is 
£205m and after income, current cash reserves 
and current long-term funding is £120m. The 
sector will need patient and appropriately 
priced capital to scale up. The premium 
associated with paying 10% versus 6% for 
funding is over £1.5m in the first four years, 
which would significantly reduce their capacity 
to grow and invest. Patient capital – provided 
over 10-15 years – would enable the CDFIs 
with breathing space to cover its cumulative 
deficit for the first three years, an important 
stumbling block for scaling up, and would 
strengthen their balance sheets. This, as well 
as a form of guarantee, could help leverage 
in external capital. Additionally, lessons from 
Europe and the US point to the need for a 
mechanism to compel or require private sector 
partners, especially banks, to lend to and invest 
in CDFIs. This can be in the form of a regulatory 
mechanism, requiring banks to fund support 
of customers at risk of customer detriment or 
use part of FCA levy, or a new social compact 
between banks, government and affordable 
credit providers.
 Uneven performance across sector: 
Performance across the sector is uneven. 
The data suggests that some providers 
outperform the rest of the sector on a recurring 
basis in terms of productivity, efficiency and 
sustainability. Greater loan sizes, greater 
scale and low total and per loan costs all 
positively contribute to a stronger financial 
performance. Financial modelling also suggests 
a consolidated sector would outperform the 
current sector. One provider is very nearly 
fully financially and operationally sustainable 
throughout the period with income from the 
lending activity.
 Need for a clear sectoral narrative: 
There is a lack of a clear, sectoral narrative 
concerning the financial and social dimension 
of the sector. On the financial side, the 
participating CDFIs use different measures 
and ways of presenting the business models, 
and portfolio characteristics, performance 
and arrears. This makes it difficult for potential 
investors to assess the risks and rewards of 
investing. On the social side, greater consistency 
in articulating and capturing target customer 
characteristics and outcomes would potentially 
enable making more of the USP of the CDFI 
sector in reaching the most excluded.
 Risks and rewards of remote 
underwriting: Moving to remote 
underwriting and delivery, especially online, 
automated lending, has the potential to 
significantly reduce costs at least over long 
term. Falls in delivery costs seemed greater than 
associated increases in customer acquisition 
costs. However, it does raise questions about 
target group. Consumers of online high cost 
credit have tended to consist of more male, 
younger customers on higher incomes versus 
the traditional base of customers (e.g. women, 
lone parents etc.). Customer data suggests 
that online borrowers are more likely to be 
homeowners and less likely to be unemployed. 
CDFI manager interviews indicate a higher 
proportion of younger, male consumers in work. 
There is potentially a risk of serving same group 
as or being perceived to serve customers that 
might be better served by other affordable 
credit providers, especially credit unions and 
new Fintech players targeting employees.
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 Great market uncertainty:  
There appears to be uncertainty concerning 
the CDFI target market. The stakeholder and 
practitioner interviews, as well as publicly 
available evidence, points to increasingly 
difficult circumstances for CDFI target 
customers combined with tightening 
affordability requirement. CDFIs reported 
having to reject increasing number of repeat 
customers due to worsening of circumstances. 
Additionally, Universal Credit, which is likely 
to have a significant impact on affordability 
and debts, has yet to be fully rolled out. There 
is also uncertainty surrounding Brexit and any 
economic fallout.
Based on these observations, we would make the 
following recommendations:
1. Government provides initial 
investment to help sector scale up:  
If the sector is to achieve significant scale 
to rival and displace commercial high cost 
providers, the CDFIs will need considerable 
upfront investment to cover investment in 
infrastructure, IT and data systems, and senior 
management structures. Examples from the 
Developing world, such as Compartamos in 
Mexico, suggest that even when MFIs have 
cost-effective operating models and viable 
business models, they need significant initial 
support to get off the ground.
a. We recommend that investors including 
Governments, Fair4All Finance and others 
provide patient capital to CDFIs with an 
efficient delivery model, low cost base and 
viable growth strategy.
b. We recommend that Government opens up 
Innovate UK funding to CDFIs.
2. Mechanisms to leverage greater 
private investment in the sector: The 
funding managed by Fair4All and current social 
investment will not be enough on its own to 
enable the sector to achieve a step change 
in growth. Indeed, our case study research 
from Europe and the US indicates that the 
private sector, especially banks, contribute 
with significant capital, technical assistance, 
volunteers and grant funding to MFIs. In 
countries where government and mainstream 
financial institutions are engaged in supporting 
affordable credit, there is often a clearly defined 
role and purpose for MFIs in terms of target 
customers and customer outcomes. Banks 
are also compelled by regulation or a social 
compact to invest. Finally, there are risk sharing 
mechanisms, such as guarantees, to reduce 
the risk for the investor. There is evidence to 
suggest that risk-sharing mechanisms, such as 
guarantees, could be an effective mechanism 
for attracting new investors to the sector.
a. We recommend that Fair4All develop clear, 
shared social outcome objectives that can 
inform a clear ask of private and public 
sector actors in terms of support for CDFIs. 
Fair4All is already developing a theory of 
change, which could inform this work.
b. We recommend that Government agrees 
a new social compact with mainstream 
financial institutions and CDFIs detailing 
their responsibilities and contributions.
c. We recommend that Fair4All and partners 
pilot a guarantee fund specifically for 
organisations that invest in the sector for 
the first time or organisations significantly 
expanding or improving the terms of their 
support (e.g. reduced rate, longer term etc.)
d. We recommend that Government extends 
the Community Investment Tax Relief 
(CITR) scheme to personal lending CDFIs. 
Although it would likely have a modest 
impact on investment, at least in the short-
term, it is a proven mechanism that would 
involve limited costs for CDFIs, investors and 
Government.
3. Consolidation or greater coordination 
among CDFIs: As the CDFIs move to 
serve customers through telephone or online 
channels, there is a greater case for M&As or at 
least greater coordination among the providers. 
This is because remote provision potentially 
brings the CDFIs into competition with each 
other, especially if they grow to the scale 
envisioned in this study. This risks the potential 
duplication of social and public investment, 
especially public funds. Furthermore, our 
modelling suggests a consolidated sector could 
potentially be more sustainable and efficient 
than the current sector. There are several areas 
for potential collaboration, including white label 
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solutions and shared technology platforms, 
shared call centres, joint procurement, 
common products, common label, agreeing 
geographical distribution of operation and 
shared delinquency management functions. 
The work on the European Code of Good 
Conduct for Microcredit Provision, which has 
involved developing pan-European standards 
for business lending MFIs, under the European 
Commission may be a good approach to this.
a. We recommend that Government and 
investors encourage greater consolidation 
by collectively supporting only providers with 
cost-effective operating models and viable 
business models.
b. We recommend that Government, investors 
and trade bodies encourage CDFIs to 
explore areas of collaboration.
4. Common reporting and benchmarking 
framework: The CDFIs operate with 
different reporting standards, especially 
regarding arrears and write-off. This lack of 
standardisation makes it more difficult for 
potential investors to understand the sector, 
which was often pointed out by investors.
a. We recommend that social investors, 
social investment funds, foundations and 
Government agree on a common reporting 
and benchmarking framework building 
on the work of Responsible Finance in 
connection with its industry survey. This 
framework should capture indicators 
pertaining to the social and financial 
dimension (see table opposite).
b. We recommend that investors require all 
investees to sign a transparency compact to 
publicly report on this data. 
Social dimension*
• Gender
• Employment status
• Ethnicity
• Housing tenure
• Household type
• High credit use
• Receipt means-tested benefits
• Take-up ancillary services
Financial dimension*
• Service & fee overview**
• Arrears*** 
• Cost per loan
• Mean/median loan amount
• income statement
• Balance sheet
*Broken down by delivery channel
**Including for ancillary services
*** This could involve using the definitions from the Bank of England credit 
union returns (3-6 months, 6-9 months, 9-12 months and more than 12 
months in arrears)
5. Greater coordination among social 
investors: The level of interest rates charged 
by social investors into CDFIs are considerable. 
This ultimately has to be passed on to the 
customer. There are several investment 
managers and funds overseeing a relatively 
small pot of funding. A greater level of 
coordination and cooperation across the social 
investment sector might contribute to reducing 
this cost. This could for example include having 
a central fund/relationship manager for CDFIs, 
which may be hosted by one organisation but 
whose costs are shared by the group. This may 
also take the form of a co-investment facility.
a. We recommend that the social investors 
develop co-investment agreements to 
reduce costs and decrease lead-in time.
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Appendices
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The team conducted a financial analysis of the historical performance and development of the participating 
CDFIs over the period covering 2013-2017. The analysis focused on the financial performance, assets and 
liabilities, and loan portfolio and growth.
Financial Performance Indicators
• Sustainability
• Efficiency
• Productivity
The sustainability of the CDFIs 
will be assessed through a 
dynamic analysis of the trend of 
their profitability results, of their 
efficiency and productivity levels, 
and their revenues and cost 
structure.
ROE; ROA; Net Interest Margin; Operational Self-
sufficiency; Financial Self-sufficiency; Portfolio 
Yield; Other Products’ Yield; Financial income 
ratio
Financial expense ratio; Provision Expense Ratio; 
Profit Margin; Portfolio to Assets Ratio; Average 
Outstanding Loan Amount; Avg. Disbursed Loan 
on p.c. GDP; Staff Allocation Ratio; Loan Officer 
Productivity; Staff Productivity; Operating 
Expenses Ratio; Cost per Borrower
Solvency and assets and liabilities management Indicators
• Solvency
• Funding
• Assets and 
liabilities 
management
The capital adequacy and its 
capacity to absorb losses and 
support growth will be assessed, 
together with the capitalization 
strategy. 
The diversification of funding 
sources and CDFIs’ refinancing 
capacity will also be assessed 
here. The exposure to market and 
liquidity risks will be included in 
the analysis.
Cost of Funds Ratio; Current Ratio; Liquidity over 
Total Assets Ratio; Cash Ratio; FX Net Open 
Position as % Equity; Debt to Equity Ratio; 
Equity to Asset Ratio; Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(MFR); Capital Adequacy Ratio (Regulatory)
Loan portfolio growth and quality Indicators
• Loan portfolio 
concentration
• Loan portfolio 
quality
• Credit risk 
coverage
The loan portfolio evolution will 
be analysed, both in terms of 
growth and quality.
The exposure of the CDFIs 
to credit risk will be assessed 
by analysing: the trends in 
the assets structure and the 
evolution and quality of loan 
portfolio, highlighting any 
potential concentrations; 
The adequacy of the credit risk 
coverage will also be analysed.
Loan portfolio growth rate
Clients growth rate
Client retention/dropout rate
Portfolio at Risk 30 (PAR 30)
Portfolio at Risk 90 (PAR 90)
Write-off Ratio
Restructured Loans Ratio
Average Credit Risk Ratio
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio
Risk Coverage Ratio (PAR 30)
A. Detailed methodology
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The achievements of the participating CDFIs 
were contextualised through an institutional 
and financial history of the participating CDFIs 
covering:
• Philosophy, aims/vision;
• Origins (e.g. original aims/vision, partners);
• Institutional and legal set-up (including how this 
may have evolved over time);
• Number/nature of partnerships (e.g. referrals, 
technology/skill transfer, funding);
• Delivery channels (i.e. branch, partner premises, 
online, phone);
• Product offering (delivery of other financial and 
non-financial services to financially excluded 
customers, such as business and housing loans);
• Diversification (delivering products outside of 
financially excluded customers, such as back-
office services, consultancy, delivering public 
contracts and trading)
• Governance structures (e.g. evolving board role 
and composition etc.)
• Professionalization (e.g. use of volunteers, 
formalisation of processes etc.);
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• Alistair Grimes, then Chair, Responsible Finance
• Jennifer Tankard, then Chief Executive, 
Responsible Finance
• Charlotte Matthews, Head Consumer Credit & 
EU Retail Unit, HMT
• Annika Tverin, National Lottery Community 
Fund
• Niall Alexander, Carnegie UK Trust
• Tom Lake, Fair4All Finance
• Rebecca McCartney, Big Society Capital
• Alastair Davis, Chief Executive, Social 
Investment Scotland
• Robert Hewitt, Senior Policy Advisor for the 
Inclusive Economy Unit
• James Broderick, chair of the Taskforce on 
Social Impact Investment
• Rowena Young, then executive director Just 
Finance Foundation
• Jonathan Flory, Social Finance
• Trevor Watson, Chair Five Lamps trading 
company
• John Tackaberry, Chair Street UK
• Chris Smyth, Chief Executive Leeds Credit Union
• James Berry, CEO Bristol Credit Union
• Steven Henderson, Chair Scotcash
• Angela Clements, Chief Executive Fair For You
• Nigel Draper, Chair Moneyline
• Graem Oram, then CEO Five Lamps
• Dhiren Master, Salary Finance
• Michael Royce, Money and Pensions Service
• Sacha Romanovitch, Fair4All Finance
• Jake Eliot, Money and Pensions Service
• James Salmon, Big Issue Invest
• Gillian Dickson, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation
B. List of stakeholders consulted
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Blockchain
• Pioneering technology initially developed as 
part of Bitcoin
• Technology based on decentralised system 
for transferring and holding data and assets 
without third party verification
• Currently least developed but seen as 
technology with potentially greatest impact 
Relevance
• Could potentially significantly reduce 
transaction costs, especially for small 
amounts
• Financial service providers are making 
significant investment in area
C. Case studies
Undeveloped but potentially 
transformative technology
Widely hailed as among the greatest recent 
technological innovations, blockchain uses a peer-
to-peer network which rids financial transactions of 
a third party, such as banks, for mediation (Ikeda 
and Hamid, 2018). In a blockchain, blocks are 
ordered block by block with each block referencing 
to the previous one and its fingerprint, and new 
ones are created by using algorithms, which 
ensures the consistency and validity. As well as a 
block’s fingerprint, each block contains content 
relating to transactions or data, as well as the 
technical data concerning the block. 
Because anybody can check any proposed 
transaction against the blockchain, this approach 
removes the need for a central authority and thus 
for participants to have confidence in the integrity 
of any single entity. Blockchain offers a range 
of benefits to organisations because they are: 
distributed widely in a precisely controlled fashion; 
highly efficient; robust in rejecting unauthorised 
changes; characterised by high level of privacy 
and confidentiality; secure for data; enabling 
significant reduction of operational costs; and 
highly transparent.
Companies are investing significantly in blockchain 
because of its perceived potential. The chart below 
the shows the estimated level of investment of 
companies (surveyed by Deloitte in 2018) in 2019.
Key data on Blockchain
Year invented: 2008
Applications Cryptocurrencies
Smart contracts
Micropayments
Real-time payments
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Overall, of the companies who took part in 
Deloitte’s global Blockchain survey, nearly 40% of 
respondents said they plan to invest over US$5m 
over the next year. In the UK, over 40% planned to 
invest more than US$5m and over 60% more than 
US$1m.
Within financial services, blockchain is seen as 
having the potential to dramatically reduce the 
cost of transactions (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017). 
For example, Circle is a start-up that provides a 
platform powered by Blockchain to receive and 
send money globally without any added fee (Ikeda 
and Hamid, 2018). Blockchain is also potentially 
beneficial for customers as well as institutions. 
Blockchain in tandem with other technologies can 
streamline this process by building shared digital 
identity storage that any finance institution can 
use. This is beneficial for institutions because it 
can assist in the verification of their customers, 
and it is beneficial for customers, because the 
security guarantees data will be protected (Ikeda 
and Hamid, 2018). Despite the potential benefits 
and the considerable investment in blockchain, the 
technology is still in its infancy and there are few 
examples of its implementation.
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Big Data
• Analysis and use of data of scale beyond 
capacity traditional data-processing capacity
• Involves use of non-traditional data sources 
captured from increasing range devices
• Widely used in financial services industry but 
requires significant investment and analytical 
capacity
Relevance
• Potential to increase speed and quality of 
lending decisions
• Use of non-traditional data sources may 
enable automated lending to consumers 
with thin credit files
Widely used but requires significant 
investment, skills and capacity
Big Data can be defined as “datasets that are too 
large for traditional data-processing systems and 
that therefore require new technologies” (Provost 
and Fawcett, 2013 cf. Power, 2014). It is different 
from conventional datasets because it involves 
greater volume, variety and velocity, often referred 
to as the three Vs (see table on p. 73).
Big Data is linked to the proliferation of data 
collected from various devices, including 
smartphones, wearable devices and other items 
able to collect and exchange data (i.e. Internet of 
things). These data sources contain a high number 
of data points (rather than a snapshot) and can 
be captured and analysed in real time. The data 
from these sources are typically combined with 
more traditional data sources (e.g. credit history, 
land registry etc.) to create new datasets. Given 
the importance of data in financial services, it is 
not surprising that Big Data is widely used by the 
sector, including:
• Fraud detection: The immediacy and scale 
of Big Data is used by many financial firms 
to detect and prevent fraud. Data on past 
purchasing behaviour, location and IP address 
detection to is widely used to assess fraud risk. 
For example, the online lender Oportun uses 
non-traditional data, such as age of email 
addresses and telephone history, to identify 
fraudulent loan applications. 
• Customer service: Financial firms are 
increasingly using Big Data to improve the 
efficiency and quality of their customer service. 
For example, CapitalOne use historical call data 
and transactional data to predict the reasons 
for customer calls to smooth out the customer 
service process.
• Lending decisions: Big Data can potentially 
reduce the risk associated with lending to 
consumers with thin or no credit files. For 
example, the US online lender Avant, which 
specialises in near- or subprime customers, 
combines credit reference data with various 
other non-traditional sources to create a 
dataset consisting of over 800 variables.
Globally, the financial services industry invested 
US$9bn in Big Data in 2018 (Lux and Delepine, 
2019) because of its potential advantages in 
terms of greater speed and accuracy in predicting 
consumer behaviour. In turn, this could enable 
more targeted and cost-effective marketing 
(reducing customer acquisition costs), reduced loan 
Key data on Big Data
Year invented: N/A
Applications Fraud detection 
Underwriting
Customer acquisition 
Market intelligence
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delinquency rates, lower attrition rates and greater 
efficiency of underwriting. Big Data, some argue, 
can also potentially enable greater customer 
retention by providing offers to customers at a 
time they are predicted to be looking for finance.
However, there are numerous challenges with Big 
Data. There is the potential for the analysis of Big 
Data to exclude certain groups from accessing 
financial services, as well as creating an unequal 
divide in data sharing. Those who have worse 
credit scores and rely on analysis of other data 
have to give up more of their privacy than those 
with better credit scores. From the point of view 
of financial service providers, smaller community 
lenders are potentially at a disadvantage in using 
Big Data. They may lack the financial resources 
and analytical skills to access and analyse datasets 
at such a scale. Improved fraud detection among 
larger financial firms may make smaller firms 
a soft target for fraudsters (Lux and Delepine, 
2019). Similarly, smaller lenders may be left with 
disproportionally more high-risk customers as 
larger lenders (subprime or mainstream) use their 
improved credit analytical capabilities to capture 
lower-risk consumers.
The three Vs of Big Data
Data  
volume
Data volume increases every day at a rate of 2.5 exabytes, or 2.5 billion gigabytes
• The volume of Wal-Mart’s hourly transaction data is 67 times that of what is contained  
in the Library of Congress
• Smart meters in China alone will generate 13.3 trillion readings in 2020
• Twelve terabytes of tweets are created each day
Data  
variety
Content comes from more diverse sources and formats
• Data can come from smartphones, sensors, RFIDs, GPS devices, transactions, and more
• Data can be in the form of databases, video, speech, social-media posts, links, tweets,  
text messages, and more
Data  
velocity
Faster analytics unlock value and reduce risk
• Organisations are analysing millions of trading events per day to identify securities fraud
• Organisations are analysing hundreds of video feeds in real time to identify security threats
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Artificial Intelligence
• Technologies capable of autonomous learning
• Often used to replace human involvement in 
customer interactions, identifying patterns and 
routine business operations
• Widely used in financial services industry 
Relevance
• Can reduce the need for human involvement 
in customer interaction
• Potential to improve sustainability of 
provision of personalised advice to 
consumers on lower incomes
Potential to reduce cost of personalised 
advice and customer interaction
As technology rapidly advances and becomes 
cheaper to implement, Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) is seen has having a role to play in financial 
services. AI can broadly be summed up as various 
technologies that have adaptive and predictive 
power, and can demonstrate autonomous learning. 
This includes machine learning – computer 
programmes that can learn and improve from 
experience without being programmed – and 
robotic process automation – robots performing 
routine business processes by following simple 
decision-making rules. Adaptivity, prediction 
and autonomous learning enable machines to 
recognise patterns, anticipate future events, make 
decisions and communicate with other people 
(Deloitte, 2018). 
There is significant investment in AI in the UK and 
globally. UK AI companies received over £800m in 
investment in the first six months of 2019 already 
surpassing the amount invested during the whole 
of 2018 and a six-fold increase on 2014. According 
to the International Data Corporation (cf. Seeley, 
2019), the banking sector is set to spend around 
US$5bn on AI systems globally in 2019 alone. 
Within financial services, AI can have a range of 
applications (see table below).
There are three key potential benefits of AI 
systems for financial services:
• Reduce costs of personalised advice: 
Providing advice through robo-advisors or 
machines can potentially significantly cut costs 
in advice provision. As noted above, this has 
enabled asset management firms to provide 
advice to customers it would not be able to 
provide through human advisors. A potential 
application in the CDFI sector would be to 
provide budgeting support and debt advice to 
applicants using AI, which is often too costly for 
CDFIs to provide.
• Reduce costs routine interactions and 
operations: AI can potentially significantly 
reduce costs associated with routine 
interactions with customers (e.g. answering 
questions, providing balances etc.) by replacing 
human staff interaction. This is already 
widespread in financial services already.
Key data on Artificial Intelligence
Year invented: N/A
Applications Investment advice
Fraud detection
Regulatory compliance
Customer interaction
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• Detect patterns not visible to human 
eye: Through machine learning, enabling 
autonomous learning, AI can identify patterns 
not visible for human analysts. This can improve 
fraud detection and replace or supplement 
human intervention.
Although potentially transformative for the 
financial services industry, there are some 
important drawbacks of AI. Privacy concern 
and cybersecurity are very important in these 
discussions about potential risks linked to future 
use of artificial intelligence and machine learning. 
AI is potentially vulnerable to software crashes, 
cyberattacks and system failure, affecting quality 
of service provision. The data used to make advice 
and recommendations more relevant can also be 
used for purposes that could be considered an 
invasion of a person’s privacy. On one hand, users 
appreciate the advantages of having one-on-one 
experiences with companies. On the other hand, 
analytics empowers businesses to collect and use 
consumer data in ways that were unimaginable 
just a few years ago. New data protection laws, 
such as GDPR, limit the access, use and storage of 
data, making partnerships with tech companies 
harder to manage. 
Use Description Benefits
Investment Robo-advisors powered by AI 
have potential to automate asset 
management & can eliminate 
financial advisors from investing 
process.
Lowers cost asset management
Potentially enables access to advice for 
ignored consumers
Eliminates human error & conflict of interest
Ensure regulatory compliance.
Customer 
engagement
Through Big Data & machine 
learning, AI chat bots can help 
customers with issues & applications, 
& make product recommendations
Attract millennials & those who prefer less 
human interaction
Increases engagement as less 
embarrassment & fear judgement 
Can tailor recommendations.
Can integrate & therefore operate through 
social media.
Fraud detection & 
risk management
Predict fraud based on analysis of 
patterns 
Helps card providers to only replace cards 
likely to experience fraudulent activity
Prevent customers from closing accounts, 
strongly correlated with number of times 
cards replaced.
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Adie (France)
• Pioneering French Microfinance Institution 
(MFI) founded in 1989
• Provides business and professional loans, 
insurance and BDS to social excluded groups
• Among largest and most influential MFIs in 
European microfinance, serving as a model 
for MFIs elsewhere in Europe (MikroStart in 
Belgium and Afi in Greece)
Relevance
• Achieved more than tenfold growth in 
lending in less than 10 years using public 
policy logic
• Relied on partnerships with banks and a 
supportive government framework
Expansion through public policy logic
The chart on p.77 shows the growth in the number 
of loans (left axis) and the outstanding loan 
portfolio (right axis) since 1996. 
Adie has grown significantly over the past 
decades. Between 1998 and 2008, alone, the MFI 
experienced more than eightfold growth from 
1,600 to nearly 13,000 loans, close to the target 
for the personal lending CDFI sector. Adie has 
not achieved this through pursuing operational 
sustainability. Instead the organisation grown due 
to two factors:
• Supportive government framework: Adie’s 
growth has been underpinned by a supportive 
government framework. In 2001, in response 
to advocacy work by its charismatic founder 
Maria Nowak, the banking law was modified 
to allow not-for-profit organisations to lend to 
unemployed and welfare benefit recipients for 
business creation or professional development. 
Prior to this, Adie had to lend in partnership 
with banks. Additionally, the government 
supports Adie through a public guarantee fund, 
tax relief and grant funding. In particular, the 
government has provided grant funding to 
support its’ headquarter operations.
• Partnerships with banks: The banks have 
been important players in supporting Adie to 
grow. They were supportive of Adie’s advocacy 
efforts to change the banking law. The banks 
are an important source of loan capital for the 
MFI. As of December 2014, the outstanding 
loans from partnering banks amounted to 
nearly €90m. Additionally, partner banks 
provide grants, soft loans and volunteers.1
Apart from capital for on-lending, there have 
been three ingredients that have been essential 
to support the scaling up of Adie: risk sharing 
mechanisms (first loss guarantees), grant funding 
1  Volunteers agree to work a minimum of 32 days a year for Adie
Key data on Adie
Year founded 1989 Loans disbursed 16,089
Country France Active clients 51,026
Branches 132 OLP €134m
Products Business loans
Quasi equity
Insurance
BDS
Employees
Volunteers
516
1,391
Data from 2017
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to support growth and investment (e.g. to open 
up new branches) and a supportive regulatory 
framework (e.g. tax relief, ability to lend directly). In 
turn, these elements are underpinned by a mutual 
understanding of the roles and expectations of the 
state, the banks and Adie. There is a clearly defined 
market that banks and other financial institutions 
are unable to serve in a commercially viable 
manner, largely due to the interest rate cap.2 This 
segment consists of socially excluded groups who 
need access to finance to access self-employment 
and employment opportunities. Adie can serve 
this market in a cost effective, but not financially 
sustainable manner. Hence, the government 
provides a supportive policy and regulatory 
environment as well as some grant funding to 
enable Adie to operate in the market. Additionally, 
banks provide extensive support in the form of 
loans, grants, risk sharing and technical assistance. 
In return, Adie passes customers on to banks for 
subsequent loans and services.
2  Interest rates for consumer loans are capped at 20%
Transferability of lessons
Although there are lessons to be learnt from 
Adie, there are factors limiting the transferability 
to UK personal lending CDFIs, namely:
• Adie only provides loans for the purposes of 
setting up your own business or accessing 
employment, the support of which is 
traditionally stronger among policy-makers 
than consumption.
• Adie operates in a space where there is 
a clear market failure, created in part by 
the interest cap, and government and the 
financial sector recognise this. In the UK, 
there is a sector that is able to serve this 
market (albeit at a higher price).
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Compartamos (Mexico)
• Large Mexican Microfinance Institution (MFI) 
founded in 1990
• Provides personal and home improvement 
loans, insurance and savings predominantly to 
female microentrepreneurs
• Has displayed remarkably high growth rates 
since being founded
Relevance
• Grew from 65,000 to 1m clients in less than 
10 years through institutional transformation
• Example of scaling up through commercial 
logic, though has been accused of exploiting 
clients to provide financial return to investors
Overcoming growth constraints through 
institutional transformation
The chart below shows the growth in the number 
of active borrowers of Compartamos since 1995. It 
also highlights the institutional transformations it 
undertook over the period.
As an NGO, Compartamos made considerable 
progress in scaling up. In 1995, within five years of 
being set up, the organisation reached over 17,000 
active clients. In the subsequent five year, the MFI 
grew to reach over 64,000 active clients. During this 
period, Compartamos received significant support 
– over US$6m in technical assistance, grants and 
subordinated debt – from international donors 
and investors to scale up. In 1997, Compartamos 
reached financial self-sufficiency, being able to cover 
operating and financing costs with income generated 
from the loan portfolio. The MFI largely achieved this 
through keeping operating costs low, relative to other 
institutions, and by charging comparatively higher 
interest rates. However, the MFI decided to undergo 
two institutional transformations to overcome 
constraints around product offering and financing:
• Becoming for-profit: In the late 1990s, 
Compartamos concluded that its status 
as NGO would constrain its future growth. 
NGOs were restricted in their ability to access 
commercial finance, especially capital markets 
(e.g. shares, equity). Hence the MFI became a 
for-profit entity in 2000. This enabled it to grow 
sevenfold within five years through two bond 
issues. Compartamos nearly doubled its annual 
growth rate from 24% (1996-00) to 46% 
(2000-06).
• Converting into bank: In 2006, the MFI 
became a bank, allowing it to offer a wider 
range of services (e.g. insurance, savings), raise 
capital through deposits and put it in a stronger 
position to access finance through capital 
markets. In 2007, Compartamos raised capital 
through a controversial IPO. Shareholders, 
including international charitable investors and 
private investors, sold 29.9% of Compartamos’ 
stock at 12 times their book value to new 
investors providing existing shareholders with 
net profits of US$460m. This was controversial 
because of the level of profits, the nature of 
investors (charitable investors) and the level of 
Key data on Compartamos
Year founded 1990 Active clients 2.5m
Country Mexico OLP £850m
Branches 586 Employees 16,133
Products Personal loans
Home improvement
Insurance
Savings
Data from 2017
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interest rates, which were higher than many 
other MFIs. The MFI grew rapidly in the years 
following the IPO and converting into a bank. It 
nearly doubled the number of clients between 
2006 and 2008, and again between 2008 and 
2011.
Compartamos, then, achieved a step change 
in growth from a small, subsidy-dependent 
organisation to a large-scale and major player 
nationally and internationally. With initial support 
from international charitable funders, the MFI 
developed a cost-effective pricing and delivery 
model able to generate returns to attract private 
investors. To be able to capitalise on this, the 
organisation underwent a series of institutional 
transformations. Although highly successful in 
scaling up, the route that Compartamos took, 
especially the IPO, was highly controversial. The 
MFI has been accused of charging excessively high 
interest rates of poor people to generate profits for 
investors.
Transferability of lessons
Although an interesting case of upscaling 
relying on a commercial logic, there are some 
important limitations to the transferability of 
the lessons to the UK personal lending context:
• There is a much larger market for MFIs 
in Mexico than in the UK, as the country 
is poorer and financial markets are less 
developed.
• Possibly due to restricted client access to 
other forms of finance, Compartamos’ 
arrears rates are considerably lower than for 
UK CDFIs (around 3%).
• There is already a developed commercial 
high cost credit sector in the UK catering to 
this market segment.
Compartamos active clients 1995-2017
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PerMicro (Italy)
• Leading Italian Microfinance Institution (MFI) 
founded in 2007
• Provides business and personal loans, insurance 
and BDS to social excluded groups
• Only licensed financial institution serving 
microfinance market
Relevance
• Has been achieving 30-40% annual growth
• Managed to pursue expansion into new 
areas through partnerships with banks 
keeping operating costs low
Expansion through public policy logic
The chart on page 81 shows the growth in the 
number of loans (left axis) and the outstanding 
loan portfolio (right axis) between 2013 and 2015.3
The MFI achieved 30-40% annual growth in 
lending over this period. Additionally, PerMicro 
reached nearly 100% operational sustainability 
and 75% financial sustainability in 2015 despite 
operating under interest rate restrictions. Much of 
this is down to the partnership arrangements it has 
with several banks.
PerMicro has a partnership model with the 
banking system in Italy and positions itself as a 
step towards bankability by serving “unbankable” 
consumers to help them become bank customers. 
PerMicro borrows from various banks in order to 
fund and disburse loans to clients. It has active, 
3  Publicly available data on PerMicro has been difficult to come by
voluntary partnerships with Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena (from 2007), Banca Regionale Europea (from 
2009), BNL - Gruppo BNP Paribas (from 2011), 
Banca Prossima (from 2013) and CEB (from 2014). 
PerMicro needs bank loans to fund its operations 
and to disburse microloans. This strategy allows 
the MFI to increase the number of clients. PerMicro 
engages the following forms of partnerships: 
• borrowing from banks, 
• having banks participate in their equity and 
• sharing front-office, back-office, branches, ATMs 
and IT with banks (Cozarenco 2015). 
Sharing offices with BNL allows PerMicro to reduce 
its operational costs, but the bank partnership 
model they use is still expensive for PerMicro as the 
banks earn high interest on their loans (Cozarenco 
2015). Working in partnerships with banks provides:
Key data on PerMicro
Year founded 2007 Loans disbursed 7,104*
Country Italy Active clients 7,093*
Branches 15* OLP €40m**
Products Business loans
Personal loans
Loan insurance
Employees
Volunteers
62**
60**
*Data from 2015; **Data from 2018 
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• funding (not determinate cost), 
• credibility (to third parties), 
• and operational/commercial support
Having a bank providing equity allows the MFI 
to increase its client base and improve its overall 
performance- the model, though expensive, is 
sustainable and efficient. Sharing office space with 
bank branches greatly reduces operating costs 
for PerMicro and allows them to expand to new 
regions more easily as a result.
For example, in 2012, BNL bought shares of 
PerMicro and opened a creditline in favour of 
PerMicro. Further, PerMicro’s headquarters and 
five branches are hosted in BNL offices across 
Italy (Cozarenco, 2015). They support PerMicro in 
their selection of funding instruments. BNL offers 
PerMicro’s products to their own clients, whilst 
PerMicro offer BNL based products to clients who 
are both interested and suitable. The partnership 
also led to the formation of the Associazione 
PerMicroLab Onlus. This is an initiative where 
retired executives mentor microentrepreneurs 
(Cozarenco, 2015). They share web marketing and 
joint communication, and many BNL retirees are 
involved in the activities of PerMicroLab. In 2014, 
of the 2,913 microcredits disbursed by PerMicro, 
592 (or 20.3%) were sourced from BNL (Cozarenco, 
2015). 
Transferability of lessons
Although there are lessons to be learnt 
from PerMicro, there are factors limiting the 
transferability to UK personal lending CDFIs, 
namely:
• PerMicro operates in a space where there 
is a clear market failure, created in part by 
the interest cap, and government and the 
financial sector recognise this. In the UK, 
there is a sector that is able to serve this 
market (albeit at a higher price).
Growth PerMicro 2013-15
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Qredits (Netherlands)
• Pioneering Netherlands Microfinance Institution 
(MFI) founded in 2009
• Provides mortgage, subordinate and overdraft 
facilities to start-ups and SMEs
• Among largest and most influential MFIs in 
European microfinance
Relevance
• Achieved eightfold growth in lending seven 
years through a branchless, technology 
platform
• Relied on partnerships with banks and 
government support
Expansion through public policy logic
The chart on page 83 shows the growth in the 
number of microloans (blue line), SME loans 
(orange) and total (green) issued by Qredits since it 
was founded in 2009. 
Qredits has grown six-fold since being set up in 
2009 with an annual growth rate of 27%. Over the 
same period, the loan portfolio grew eightfold. The 
MFI reached operational sustainability in 2015 and 
a financial sustainability ratio of nearly 100% in 
2015. 
There are several factors that may have contributed 
to the growth of Qredits:
• Close links with banks: Qredits works in 
close partnership with banks. Banks refer 
unsuccessful applicants to Qredits, co-finance 
larger business loans, provide funding and sit 
on its board. Qredits coordinate and agree with 
banks on lending limits and provides training 
of bank call centre staff to support effective 
referrals. Three banks also contributed a total of 
€1.2m in set-up funding for Qredits.
• Technology-based delivery model: The MFI 
operates with a branchless model, in which loan 
officers conduct field visits to applicants. There 
is an online application process which reduces 
the number of applicants. Some loans are also 
approved online. In addition, Qredits draws on 
a large group of volunteer mentors to support 
customers and applicants in developing their 
business plans. 
• Support by government: Although Qredits 
today is financially sustainable, the Dutch 
government played an important role in 
supporting the set-up of the MFI. It provided 
€0.4m in initial operational funding as well as 
a subordinated loan of €15m. This enabled 
Qredits to grow and access other forms of 
funding.
Key data on Qredits
Year founded 2009 Loans disbursed 2,329
Country Netherlands Active clients 4,120
Branches 1 OLP €110m
Products Microcredit
SME loan
Mortgage
Flexible
Subordinate loan
Employees
Volunteers
66
600
Data from 2017
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Transferability of lessons
Although there are lessons to be learnt from Qredits, there are factors limiting the transferability to UK 
personal lending CDFIs, namely:
• Qredits only provides business loans, the support of which is traditionally stronger among policy-makers 
than consumption.
• Qredits operates in a space where there is a clear market failure, created in part by the interest cap, and 
government and the financial sector recognise this. In the UK, there is a sector that is able to serve this 
market (albeit at a higher price).
• Although we have not analysed the determinants of sustainability of Qredits, clearly being able to offer 
higher ticket loans (up to €250,000) will benefit the MFI through greater interest income per loan to 
cover underwriting costs.
Loans issued by Qredits (2009-17)
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Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) (USA)
• Act designed to discourage redlining and 
encourage banks to lend in all communities
• Banks receive CRA rating, which may affect 
ability to engage in M&As, open branches or 
expand into other states
• Can fulfil CRA obligations through supporting 
and investing in CDFIs
Relevance
• Much-discussed regulation incentivising 
banks to support CDFIs
• Attributed with significant increase in bank 
funding of CDFIs from $12.7m to $1.7bn in 
20 years
CRA important in scaling up US CDFI 
sector
In 1992, the Clinton administration made the 
enforcement of the CRA stricter and made CDFI 
expansion a key objective. Three years later 
CRA regulation recognised CDFIs as qualifying 
investments and borrowers facilitating investment 
in the sector. The sector expanded considerably 
over this period. According to data from the largest 
CDFI trade body (Opportunity Finance Network), 
borrowing to US CDFIs grew from US$140m in 
1994 to US$1.7bn in 2013. The chart below shows 
the evolution of the average proportion of that 
borrowing by source.
4
The proportion of funds held by CDFIs from 
individuals and religious foundations has decreased 
significantly between 1994 and 2013. Conversely, 
the proportion of borrowed funds from banks 
increased substantially in the same period. In 
absolute terms, the amount received from banks 
increased from US$12.7m in 1994 to US$1.7bn in 
4 These tests examine: institution’s provision of mortgage, small business 
and community development loans (lending test); its provision of retail 
banking services; and investment in organisations conducting work in 
low- and moderate-income communities
2013. This has to a large extent been attributed 
to the changes in CRA in 1995. Between 1977 and 
2001, financial institutions under CRA entered over 
370 agreements with CDFIs of a value of US$1tn, 
98% of which were made after 1992 (Pinsky, 2001).
Federal funding also increased, especially from 
1994 to 2002. This is because of the establishment 
of the CDFI Fund, a Federal government fund 
providing loans, grants and capital to US CDFIs. 
In addition to encouraging banks to invest in and 
support CDFIs, the Act has also been attributed 
with enabling the sector to leverage other funding. 
Having the regular support from the banks makes 
CDFIs look more appealing to private and public 
funders (Seidman et al, 2017) and therefore helps 
them to find support elsewhere.
The CRA has contributed to the expansion of the 
CDFI sector by providing a regulatory obligation 
for banks to serve all communities and recognising 
the CDFI sector as a means to fulfilling CRA 
requirements. 
Key data on CRA
Year introduced 1977 Country USA
CRA tests Lending test 
Service test
Investment test4
Regulatory bodies Office of Comptroller
Federal Reserve
FDIC
FDIC = Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Transferability of lessons
There are lessons to be learnt from CITR. However, there are factors limiting the transferability to personal 
lending CDFIs, including:
• Timing and context: The context in which the CRA was introduced is rooted in civil rights movement; 
history of segregation and on the back of evidence of redlining based on race. It was also designed for 
a market with many small, regional banks and at the time of branch-based expansion. None of this can 
be said to apply to the UK today.
• Regulatory culture: US regulatory authorities have historically been more prone to intervening in 
financial markets than is the case in the UK. 
• Real estate lending: Mortgage or real estate lending has been a major part of the expansion of the 
US CDFI sector. Housing finance lends itself to scaling up in that it is secured and comparatively lower 
risk. However, housing loans have for various reasons been negligible in the UK CDFI sector.
Average source of borrowed funds for US CDFIs 1994-2013 (%)
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Community Investment Tax Relief
• Tax relief scheme introduced in 2002 to 
encourage private investment in under-invested 
communities
• Enables investor to invest in accredited CDFI to 
reduce income or corporation tax liability
• Funding on-lent to support enterprise lending to 
disadvantaged end-beneficiaries
Relevance
• Established mechanism to incentivise private 
investment in UK CDFI sector
• Provides potential model for personal lending 
tax relief
Fulfils objective but limited impact CDFI 
sector
CITR works as follows:
• Investors: Individual and corporate investors 
receive income or corporate tax relief worth 
25% of the money invested and spread over 
five years. They can invest in accredited CDFIs 
through bank deposits5 (account for two thirds 
of investment under CITR), shares (account 
for less than 5%) or via a loan (most common 
mechanism for non-bank accredited CDFIs).
• Accredited CDFIs: To be eligible to receive 
investment under CITR, the organisation 
needs to be accredited by the Office of the 
CIC Regulator (under Department for Business, 
Environment and Industrial Strategy) as a 
wholesale or retail CDFI. A wholesale CDFI 
can raise up to £20m to lend to other CDFIs, 
whilst a retail CDFI can raise up to £10m to lend 
directly to businesses. The accredited CDFIs 
5  In which case, accredited organisation needs to be a bank
have to onward lend 75% of the investment 
(i.e. has to matched with new lending).
• End beneficiaries: The end beneficiaries can 
receive loans of up to £250,000 (non-profit 
enterprises) or £100,000 (for-profit). They have 
to be SMEs in disadvantaged community. This 
is defined as enterprises located in the 35% 
most deprived areas or owned and operated 
by, or intended to serve, individuals recognised 
as being disadvantaged on account of their 
characteristics (e.g. gender, ethnicity etc.).
Recent research suggests that the scheme is viewed 
favourably within government.6 As the only relief with 
a clear policy focus to provide finance for businesses 
based in or supporting disadvantaged communities, 
the view of HMT remains that the scheme is well 
targeted and its key objective, i.e. providing finance 
into disadvantaged communities, has been met. It is 
also a component of BEIS Access to Finance policy. 
Additionally, the scheme has avoided falling foul of 
state aid rules through State Aid de minimis (as aid 
6  Aslan, S., Freeman, R. and Henry, N. (2018). Community Investment Tax 
Relief (CITR) and the Responsible Finance Sector. March 2018
Key data on CITR
Year introduced 2002 Accredited CDFIs 34
Loan limit
For-profit
Not-for-profit
£100,000
£250,000
Departments
Policy lead
Accreditation
HM Treasury
Office of CIC Regulator
Investment limit
Retail
Wholesale
£10m
£20m
Investment raised
Total
2017
£145m
£16m
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levels less than €200,000 to individual investors over 
3-year period) meaning there is no requirement to 
formally report State Aid levels to Commission. 
However, the scheme has fallen significantly short 
of government expectations of raising £100m 
annually to support the CDFI sector. Since 2002, 
it is estimated that the scheme has raised £145m 
in total or less than £10m annually. Moreover, 
of this, two thirds have been raised by two large 
social banks. There are a number of reasons for 
the lower than expected uptake, including lack of 
awareness and understanding of CITR, competitor 
schemes, restriction of CITR investment limits and 
complexity. 
The CDFIs have found the scheme to be most 
effective when used in combination with first 
loss guarantee (e.g. Regional Growth Fund). The 
fact that CITR can now be used alongside the 
Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) is believed 
to be an opportunity to significantly increase 
use and effectiveness of the scheme. To take full 
advantage of the scheme, it is also necessary for 
the CDFI to be able to generate sufficient levels of 
new lending to fulfil 75% criteria.
Transferability of lessons
There are lessons to be learnt from CITR. 
However, there are factors limiting the 
transferability to personal lending CDFIs, 
including:
• There are not currently any first loss cover 
mechanisms (i.e. equivalent to EFG) for 
personal lending, which could hamper its 
effectiveness
• There is a clear-cut public policy case for 
intervention. There is a market failure (i.e. 
viable businesses go unfunded), whereas the 
market enables households to access finance 
albeit at a higher price.
• There is clear cross-party for supporting 
businesses in disadvantaged communities, 
unlike consumer lending, which is 
controversial and seemingly at odds with 
other policy objectives (i.e. saving etc.)
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About Community Finance Solutions 
Community Finance Solutions (CFS) is an award-winning independent research unit specialising in financial 
and social inclusion, and community asset ownership. Located within the University of Salford, CFS offers 
independent research and advisory services to social landlords, local authorities, national government, 
charities and other organisations and agencies. Founded in 1999 by Professor Karl Dayson and Dr Bob 
Paterson, CFS was established to help empower communities to solve local problems relating to land and 
financial inclusion. Between them they developed solutions for securing community ownership of land 
and also models for the provision of loans to low income households who found themselves excluded 
from mainstream lending. These solutions have gradually extended over time and now CFS remains at the 
forefront of pioneering social research.
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